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CREATING AN ENVIRONMENTAL NO-MAN’S LAND:
THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S DEPARTURE FROM
ENVIRONMENTAL AND INDIAN LAW PROTECTING A
TRIBAL COMMUNITY’S HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
Claire R. Newman*
Abstract: When Congress set aside reservations as permanent homelands for
American Indian people, it intended that the reservations remain “livable
environments.” When resource conflicts arise in “checkerboard” areas outside
Indian reservations—where land ownership alternates between a tribe, state,
the federal government and private, non-Indian landowners—disputes over
regulatory jurisdiction and environmental protection intensify. Two recent Tenth
Circuit opinions determining the next generation of uranium mining in the
checkerboard area of the Navajo Nation, depart from the intent of environmental
laws and fail to uphold federal agencies’ trust responsibilities to the Tribe. These
cases illustrate the legal vulnerabilities tribal communities in checkerboard
areas face through the loss of their environmental and public health and the
potentially massive cost of remediation. This comment urges the federal
government to strike a more equitable balance of authority, risk and cost by
retaining environmental regulatory jurisdiction in checkerboard areas and by
writing Indian Trust Impact Statements that will help ensure that the federal
government fulfills its trust responsibility to tribes.
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Today, I am a man who has lost his health, his family and
his ancestral way of life because of uranium.1

* JD Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, 2012.
1. The Health and Environmental Impacts of Uranium Contamination in the Navajo
Nation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter Cong. Hearing on Uranium] (statement of Ray Manygoats, Navajo tribal
member).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Natural resource conflicts scar the history of Indian
country.2 The focus of these conflicts has evolved with
changing modes of economic growth, from furs, to farmland, to
gold, to energy resources. Of existing energy resources in the
United States, four percent of onshore oil and gas reserves,
thirty percent of Western coal, and forty percent of uranium
deposits lie beneath lands in Indian country.3 For some
companies, the mineral wealth they own in Indian country
represents the companies’ “intrinsic value” to investors, and
profits from those minerals depend upon companies’
uncompromised access to them.4
The United States government and American Indian tribes,
however, value these lands differently. Congress has
recognized tribal lands as permanent homelands for American
Indians,5 and courts have recognized Congress’ intent for these
homelands to provide “livable environments.”6 American
Indians’ ancestral, spiritual and kinship ties continue to bind
them to their land.7 Thus, maintaining livable environments is
2. Indian country generally refers to areas within which a tribe’s laws and customs
and federal laws relating to tribes and tribal members govern. For the legal definition
of Indian country discussed in this comment, see 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
3. Robert T. Anderson et al., FELIX COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 965
(2005).
4. Hydro Resources, Incorporated (HRI), a subsidiary of Texas-based Uranium
Resources, Inc. (URI), described its uranium holdings to investors: “URI’s intrinsic
value lies in the 183,000 acres and 101.4 million pounds of in-place mineralized
uranium holdings in New Mexico.” Company News: Uranium Resources, MINING,
PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Aug. 30, 2010) http://www.mpe-magazine.com/
RESOURCES,
INC.,
company-news/uranium-resources.
See
also
URANIUM
http://www.uraniumresources.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
5. Courts have recognized tribes’ water rights as a necessary corollary to the
establishment of Indian reservations as permanent homelands for tribes for over a
century. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (holding that the
Fort Belknap Reservation was reserved as a “permanent home and abiding place of the
Gros Ventre and Assiniboine” tribes and that the tribes’ rights to the Milk River
“necessarily continued through the years.”); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394,
1414 (9th Cir. 1983) (same, citing Winters); In re the Gen. Adjudication of All the
Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. and Source (In re Adjudication of Gila River
Sys.), 35 P.3d 68, 72 (Ariz. 2001) (same, citing Winters).
6. “We agree with the Supreme Court that the essential purpose of Indian
reservations is to provide Native American people with a “permanent home and
abiding place,” that is, a “livable” environment.” In re Adjudication of Gila River Sys,
35 P.3d at 72–74 (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963)) (internal
citation omitted).
7. Our future is tied to the land. No matter how far we advance as a society, that
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essential to American Indians’ vibrant future.8
With continued global economic growth dependent on a
steady supply of energy resources, resource extraction
companies and tribes will be inextricably linked for the
foreseeable future. Federal courts will continue to face the
challenge of resolving resource conflicts in Indian country. In
resolving these conflicts, courts are faced with the questions:
What constitutes Indian country? And, which government—
tribal, state or federal—has authority to approve resource
development projects there? Courts have dealt with resource
conflicts on reservations for many years,9 but when these
conflicts arise in “checkerboard” areas surrounding
reservations—areas where land ownership alternates between
tribal,
state
and
federal
governments—jurisdictional
uncertainty
complicates
regulatory
authority.10
Such
jurisdictional confusion intensifies resource conflicts and
increases antagonism between tribes, states, the federal
government and private companies.11
Two recent Tenth Circuit decisions, Hydro Resources Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency (HRI III)12 and Morris v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Morris),13 address uranium
single fact persists and in some ways constrains our dreams for the future. . . . The
land, they say, embodies a continuing legacy of natural wealth . . . .True
environmental self-determination, however, depends upon the ability of Indian
nations to preserve their landbases and engage in economic development
according to their own policies and values.
Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The
Role of Ethics, Economics and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225,
225, 330 (1996).
8. See id. at 286 n.356 (1996) (noting that Indian communities “cannot afford a
catastrophe such as Love Canal, where the only means of protecting the population
from hazardous conditions is removal”).
9. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (denying the Crow Tribe
the right to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee lands on the
Crow Reservation).
10. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (denying
Yankton Sioux Tribe the right to regulate solid waste landfill site based on the
determination that the site was no longer within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation and that South Dakota had acquired regulatory jurisdiction over the site).
See generally Judith V. Royster, Of Surplus Lands and Landfills: The Case of the
Yankton Sioux, 43 S.D. L. REV. 283 (1998) for further discussion of this case.
11. See, e.g., Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 329. See generally Royster, supra note
10.
12. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131
(10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision).
13. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S. Nov. 15 (2010) (Mem).
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mining in the checkerboard region adjacent to the Navajo
Nation reservation and exemplify a natural resource conflict
amplified by jurisdictional confusion. This comment argues
that the courts in HRI III and Morris employ a backwardlooking approach to determine tribal jurisdiction, ignore the
federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes and
undermine the text and purpose of environmental statutes. In
doing so, the courts write a new, troubling chapter in the
Navajo Nation’s long history with uranium mining. To ensure
that tribal lands offer “livable environments” for generations to
come, consistent with congressional intent, this comment
contends that federal agencies must (1) retain regulatory
authority to ensure that tribes’ natural resources and their
communities’ public health are adequately protected, and must
(2) write “Indian Trust Impact Statements” to identify and
mitigate potential harm to tribes’ natural resources.
Part II of this comment presents and critiques the Tenth
Circuit’s approach in HRI III and Morris to jurisdictional
disputes, environmental protection under the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA) and the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and public health protection under the Atomic Energy
Act (AEA). Part III examines the effect these decisions have on
a Navajo community, on its environment and on democratic
accountability to the tribal community. Part IV recommends
first, that the federal government retain environmental
regulatory authority over checkerboard areas; and second, that
the federal government require agencies to write “Indian Trust
Impact Statements” to clarify when a tribe’s trust assets will
be affected and how the trust assets will be protected. In these
ways, the federal government can avoid or defuse natural
resource conflicts in checkerboard areas, fulfill its trust
responsibility to tribes and ensure that federal environmental
laws protect public health and the environment as Congress
intended.
II.

THE LEGAL AND LOCAL HISTORIES OF HRI III AND
MORRIS

Both HRI III and Morris involve Hydro Resources
Incorporated (HRI), the Navajo Nation and its members,
federal agencies and the State of New Mexico. As will be
discussed in Part III.C, infra, the cases also raise crucial issues
for similarly situated tribes and tribal communities across the
country.
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HRI is a groundwater development company that mines
uranium through the in situ leach (ISL) uranium mining
process14 and is a subsidiary of Texas-based, Uranium
Resources, Inc. (URI).15 HRI owns 183,000 acres of land across
seven sites in northwestern New Mexico on the boarder of the
Navajo Nation reservation.16 This area is home to the largest
known deposit of uranium in the country and one of the largest
deposits of uranium in the world.17 HRI’s seven sites contain
101.4 million pounds of mineralized uranium, of which its site
in the Church Rock Chapter of the Navajo Nation holds more
uranium than any other site.18 Specifically, HRI’s Church Rock
site consists of two adjacent parcels of land in Sections 8 and
17, which are surrounded by lands predominantly owned by
tribal members, the tribe itself or the federal government in
trust for tribal members.19
The Navajo Nation occupies the largest reservation in the
United States, spanning a 27,000 square mile area from
southeastern Utah to northeastern Arizona to northwestern
New Mexico.20 The Navajo Nation is home to more than
14. Id. at 682 (explaining that in situ leach uranium mining is a recently developed
uranium extraction method which requires injecting lixiviant, groundwater charged
with oxygen and bicarbonate, into a well field and flushing out the uranium ore).
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, “the use of these in-situ leach mining
techniques at uranium mines is considerably more environmentally benign than
traditional mining and milling of uranium ore. Nonetheless, the use of leaching fluids
to mine uranium contaminates the groundwater aquifer in and around the region from
which the uranium is extracted.” J.A. DAVIS, G.P. CURTIS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
NUREG/CR – 6870, CONSIDERATION OF GEOCHEMICAL ISSUES IN GROUNDWATER
RESTORATION AT URANIUM IN-SITU LEACH MINING FACILITIES V (2007), available at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0706/ML070600405.pdf. See HRI’s website for an
overview of the company’s capabilities, http://www.hydroresources.com/index.html
(last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
15. URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2010).
16. See generally URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 4, 24–35 (2010),
available at http://www.uraniumresources.com/projects/newmexico.html for a detailed
description of URI’S operations, maps of mining sites, financial status forecast, legal
and financial risks and litigation.
17. LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS, URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT
(2010).
18. URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2010).
19. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131,
1136–7 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision); Morris v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 683 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S.
Nov. 15 (2010) (Mem).
20. See History, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE NAVAJO NATION, http://www.navajonsn.gov/history.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2011).
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175,228 Navajo people21 for whom the environment remains a
defining element of their identity, life ways, spirituality,
economy and future wellbeing.22 The Church Rock Chapter is
located in the eastern portion of the Navajo Nation, which is
central to Navajos’ origins and spirituality.23 Ninety-eight
percent of residents in the Church Rock Chapter are Navajo24
and eighty-eight percent of the land surrounding HRI’s parcel
is owned by the Tribe, tribal members or held in trust for the
Tribe.25
For HRI to mine uranium at the Church Rock site, it needed
a permit under the SDWA to allow its injection of fluid
contaminants in to the groundwater,26 as well as a “source
materials license”27 under the AEA to possess, process and
transport uranium.28 As a result of the Tenth Circuit’s

21. U.S. CENSUS, 2000, Population Living on Selected Reservations, Trust Lands and
Alaska Native Areas, http://www.census.gov/ (search “population of Navajo Nation,”
then follow hyperlink to Population Living on Selected Reservations and Trust Lands)
(last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
22. A. The four sacred elements of life, air, light/fire, water and earth/pollen in all
their forms must be respected, honored and protected for they sustain life; . . . D.
The Diné have a sacred obligation and duty to respect, preserve and protect all
that was provided for we were designated as the steward of these relatives
through our use of the sacred gifts of language and thinking; and E. Mother Earth
and Father Sky is part of us as the Diné and the Diné is part of Mother Earth and
Father Sky; . . . F. The rights and freedoms of the people to the use of the sacred
elements of life as mentioned above and to the use of the land, natural resources,
sacred sites and other living beings must be accomplished through the proper
protocol of respect and offering and these practices must be protected and
preserved for they are the foundation of our spiritual ceremonies and the Diné life
way; and G. It is the duty and responsibility of the Diné to protect and preserve
the beauty of the natural world for future generations.
1 Navajo Nation Code, Section 205, Nahasdzáán dóó Yádiłhił Bitsąądęę
Beenahaz’áanii-Diné Natural Law (2002) http://www.navajocourts.org/Resolutions/CN69-02Dine.pdf. See also Rebecca Tsosie, supra note 7, at 268–302 for a discussion of the
intersection of the natural, spiritual, cultural and economic realms as they influence
tribal environmental policy in several American Indian communities.
23. PETER IVERSON, DINÉ: A HISTORY OF THE NAVAJOS at 10–11, University of New
Mexico Press (2002).
24. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1169 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1168, 1180. See discussion of the physical, social and political make-up of
the Church Rock Chapter in Part II.A.3 infra.
26. See Application for a [Underground Injection Control] permit; authorization by
permit, 40 C.F.R. § 144.31 (2006); see also Criteria for establishing permitting
priorities, 40 C.F.R. § 146.9.
27. Definitions, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(z) (2006) (“The term “source material” means (1)
uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Commission . . .
to be source material; or (2) ores . . .”).
28. See License requirements for transfers, 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (2006); General
requirements for issuance of specific licenses, 10 C.F.R. § 40.32 (2006).
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decisions in HRI III and Morris, HRI overcame two major
obstacles obstructing its ability to mine uranium at Church
Rock. In HRI III, the court determined that because HRI’s land
in Section 8 was not within Indian country, the State of New
Mexico, not the federal Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), had authority to permit HRI’s activities under the
SDWA.29 In Morris, the court upheld the source materials
license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
(NRC) to HRI.30
To evaluate the HRI III and Morris decisions and the
alternative outcomes that were available to the Tenth Circuit,
it is critical to understand the history of courts’ “dependent
Indian community” doctrine,31 land ownership in the Church
Rock Chapter and uranium mining involving the Navajo
Nation. Following this history, this section analyzes the Tenth
Circuit’s decisions and motivations for its decisions in HRI III
and Morris.
A.

Hydro Resources, Inc. v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency (HRI III): Jurisdiction in Dependent
Indian Communities

In HRI III, the court considered which sovereign—the
Navajo Nation, the State of New Mexico or the EPA—had the
authority under the SDWA to permit HRI’s ISL uranium
mining project on Section 8 of the Church Rock Chapter of the
Navajo Nation.32 This question turned on whether HRI’s land
was within a “dependent Indian community” and therefore
constituted “Indian country.” If Section 8 was Indian country,
the land would fall within federal, and potentially tribal,
jurisdiction.33 The court’s answer to this question would
determine the future of HRI-URI’s future in uranium mining,34
29. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131,
1166 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision).
30. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677, 705
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S. Nov. 15 (2010) (Mem).
31. Dependent Indian communities are one category of Indian country as defined by
18 U.S.C § 1151(b) and discussed in Part II.A.1–2 infra.
32. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1134.
33. See Indian Tribes, 40 C.F.R. §§ 145.52, 145.56, 145.58 (2006) (tribes are eligible
to apply for primary enforcement of the Underground Injection Control Program
within the area of the tribal government’s jurisdiction).
34. URI’s financial future is precarious. Its 2010 Annual Report warns:
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the extent of New Mexico’s regulatory authority and the
Church Rock community’s air and water quality. The evolution
of courts’ interpretations of “dependent Indian community”
was central to the Tenth Circuit’s decision that HRI’s land was
not part of a dependent Indian community. This comment
argues that the court’s opinion was motivated by an “allotment
era” perspective and a preference for administrative
expedience.
1.

The Genesis of Dependent Indian Communities

Indian country defines the area within which a tribe’s laws
and customs, and federal laws relating to tribes and tribal
members generally govern, as distinct from state law.35 Indian
country is most often defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151,36 commonly
referred to as the “Indian country statute.” According to that
statute, Indian country is recognized in three areas:
reservations,37 dependent Indian communities,38 and Indian
allotments.39 The dependent Indian communities portion of the
[w]e are not producing uranium at this time, nor do we expect to begin production
in the near future unless uranium prices recover to sustained profitable levels. As
a result, we currently have no sources of operating cash. If we cannot monetize
certain existing Company assets, partner with another Company that has cash
resources, . . . or have the ability to access additional sources of private or public
capital we may not be able to remain in business . . . We do not have a committed
source of financing for the development of our New Mexico Properties, including
the Churchrock Property, which is the property we expect to develop first in New
Mexico.”
URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 10–14 (2010).
35. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883) (federal laws are not
applicable to Indian country unless Congress so expressly legislates); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of
Georgia can have not force.”).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 is found within the criminal code, however, jurisdiction under
the statute can also extend to the civil context. See California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 n.5 (1987).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2006) (“[t]he term “Indian country” . . . means (a) all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including the rights-ofway running through the reservation”).
38. Id. § 1151(b) (“[t]he term “Indian country” . . . means (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a
state”).
39. Id. § 1151(c) (“[t]he term “Indian country” . . . means (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same”).
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statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b), at issue in HRI III, codified two
Supreme Court cases—United States v. Sandoval40
(recognizing the Santa Clara Pueblo as a dependent Indian
community) and United States v. McGowan41 (recognizing the
Reno Indian Colony as a dependent Indian community).
In both Sandoval and McGowan, the Court looked to the
purpose of the applicable statute to determine whether
Congress had intended to recognize a dependent Indian
community. In Sandoval, the Court focused on the purpose of a
federal liquor law to protect Indian people from non-Indians’
exploitive sales to Indian people, and the federal government’s
treatment of the Pueblo—its provision of agricultural
implements, irrigation and education to the people.42 The
Court also found the fact that Pueblo lands were not held in
trust by the federal government, but by the people in
communal fee simple, did not preclude recognition of the
Pueblo as a dependent Indian community.43 Finally, the Court
affirmed Congress’ authority to determine Indian country
status, as opposed to the courts, and patently rejected the
notion that any community would be labeled an Indian tribe,
but rather, only “distinctly Indian communities.”44
In McGowan, the Court introduced a rule to determine
dependent Indian country status: whether the land had been
“validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the
superintendence of the government.”45 The majority of the
Court’s discussion reviews Congress’ intent to set aside a
homeland for displaced Indian people in Nevada and the
federal government’s similar treatment of the Indian Colony to
other reservations.46 In addition, the Court approached the
issue of Indian country status flexibly: “[w]e must consider ‘the
changes which have taken place in our situation, with a view
of determining from time to time what must be regarded as
Indian country,’”47 and within the context of the federal

40. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
41. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
42. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 39–42.
43. Id. at 48.
44. Id. at 46.
45. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 537 citing Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883).
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government’s long-standing relationship with Indians.48
2.

Courts’ Evolving Interpretation of Dependent Indian
Communities

After the enactment of the Indian country statute in 1948,
courts recognized a third category of dependent Indian
communities (in addition to Pueblos and Indian colonies)—
those that exist outside the boundaries of a reservation.49
Dependent Indian communities located outside the exterior
boundaries of reservations are the product of allotment era
policy from the 1880s to the 1920s. During that time, Congress
allotted land to individual Indians on and off reservations in
an effort to assimilate Indians into agricultural society.50
Subsequently, many allotments were transferred lawfully and
unlawfully into non-Indian ownership, resulting in a total loss
of 150 million acres of land to Indian tribes.51 In addition,
Congress restored some of the remaining reservation land that
had not been allotted to “public domain” and sold it to nonIndian homesteaders.52
In jurisdictional disputes since the allotment era, many
courts have diminished Indian reservations’ original
boundaries established by treaties and executive orders.53 In
this way, allotment resulted in “checkerboard” land ownership
on and off reservations where land parcels may be owned by
the tribe, by individual Indians, by the federal government in
trust for the tribe, or by private, non-Indian owners.54 In cases
48. Id. at 539 (“[w]hen we view the facts of this case in the light of the relationship
which has long existed between the government and the Indians-and which continues
to date-it is not reasonably possible to draw any distinction between this Indian
‘colony’ and “Indian country.’”).
49. Robert T. Anderson et al., supra note 3, at 194.
50. See id. at 77–78.
51. Id.
52. Id. 77–79 (explaining that by 1934, tribes retained only forty-eight million acres,
down from 156 million acres in 1881, the end of the treaty making era). See also
Douglas Nash & Eric Eberhard, Forward at the Seattle University Symposium,
Perspectives on Tribal Land Acquisition, 23–24 (Jun. 3, 2010) (transcript available in
the Seattle University School of Law Library) (explaining that prior to the arrival of
Europeans, Indian tribes occupied 1.9 billion acres in North America).
53. Compare Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472 (1984) (concluding that Congress
did not intend to diminish the reservation), with South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,
522 U.S. 329, 358 (1998) (concluding that Congress intended to diminish the
reservation).
54. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131,
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involving disputes in such checkerboard areas adjacent to
reservations, courts must often determine dependent Indian
community status.55 As a result, dependent Indian
communities are recognized on an ad hoc basis without an
official method to quickly confirm their status. In addition,
because federal agencies are most familiar with tribal
authority on reservations,56 they sometimes view dependent
Indian communities as anomalous and problematic.57 As
illustrated below, the absence of a modern dependent Indian
community statute leaves communities in checkerboard areas
adjacent to reservations subject to the shifting winds of federal
common law.
Over twenty years after the passage of the Indian country
statute, United States v. Martine was the first case to construe
18 U.S.C. § 1151(b).58 In that case, the Tenth Circuit construed
Sandoval’s “federal treatment of the Indian community” factor
as requiring the court’s inquiry into “the nature of the area in
question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to
Indian Tribes and to the federal government, and the
established practice of government agencies toward the
area.”59 As in Sandoval, the Martine court also assuaged any
fear that dependent Indian community status would be
recognized arbitrarily.60
In Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company v.
Watchman,61 the court formalized Martine’s additional,
community-specific factors into a two-step analysis to
1136 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision).
55. See, e.g., Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531,
1542–46 (10th Cir. 1995) (outlining a multi-factor dependent Indian community
analysis) (overruled in Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III),
608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision)); United States v. Martine, 442
F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971) (checkerboard area outside Navajo Reservation is a
dependent Indian community).
56. See generally HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131; see also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
57. See generally HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131.
58. Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023.
59. Id. at 1023.
60. Id. at 1024 (“Appellant urges that such a holding implies that wherever a group
of Indians is found, e.g., in Los Angeles, there is a dependent Indian community . . .
The mere presence of a group of Indians in a particular area would undoubtedly not
suffice.”).
61. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1542–46
(10th Cir. 1995).
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determine dependent Indian community status. Though the
Watchman analysis was partially rejected in Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Government,62 lower courts’ continued
to distinguish Venetie and applied parts of the Watchman
analysis.63 This trend indicated courts’ understanding of the
importance of community-specific factors to a proper
determination of dependent Indian community status,64 the
presumption in favor of the continued existence of Indian
country65 and the requirement that congressional intent to
terminate Indian country status must be clearly expressed.66
In Watchman, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the
Navajo Nation could impose a levy on source gains from
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company’s (P&M) coal
mines located adjacent to the reservation.67 The lands at issue
in Watchman are typical of checkerboard areas. P&M shared
its ownership interest in the surface estate with the Tribe,
Tribal allottees, the State of New Mexico and the federal
government. P&M shared its coal estate with the federal
government, the State of New Mexico and the Cerillos Land

62. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t (Venetie), 522 U.S. 520
(1998) (overruling Watchman’s multi-factor analysis and replacing it with a two-step
bright-line rule).
63. Despite Venetie’s partial dismissal of the Watchman test, some courts
distinguished Venetie and continued to apply Watchman’s “community of reference
test.” See United States v. Arrieta, 436 F.3d 1246, 1250–52 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying
Watchman’s “community of reference test” to an entire Pueblo (not only the road in
question) before applying Venetie’s two-pronged rule); Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d
591, 599–600 (N.M. 2009) (holding that the fee land in question is “Indian country” for
the purpose of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act because §
1151(b) does not determine civil jurisdiction, and therefore, Venetie does not apply);
State v. Romero, 142 P.3d 887, 891–93 (N.M. 2006) (applying Watchman’s “community
of reference” test and holding that non-Indian fee land within the exterior boundaries
of a Pueblo is part of a dependent Indian community); but see State v. Frank, 52 P.3d
404, 407–10 (N.M. 2002) (adopting Venetie); Thompson v. Franklin, 127 F. Supp.2d
145, 156–159 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (adopting Venetie).
64. But see Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d
1131, 1156 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision) (noting that “[n]othing in Sandoval
or McGowan suggests that the metes and bounds of “dependent Indian communities”
should be determined by a court’s perceptions about local social, political or geographic
affinities).
65. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 556–68 (1903).
66. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998).
67. See, e.g., Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531,
1534 (10th Cir. 1995).
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Company.68
Watchman largely concretized the dependent Indian
community tests courts had used for the past twenty years.69
The first part of the Watchman two-step analysis requires
courts to locate the relevant “community of reference.”70 The
Watchman court rejected the district court’s narrow definition
of the community of reference as the mine site (excluding the
surrounding area) noting, “the existence of a dependent Indian
community does not depend on the relative size of the
geographical area.”71 Building upon Martine’s precedent, the
second step of the Watchman test considers:72 (1) whether the
United States retained title to the lands; (2) the relationship of
the residents to the Tribe and the federal government; (3)
whether the area demonstrates cohesiveness; and (4) whether
the lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy and
protection of the dependent Indian peoples.73
In Venetie,74 the United States Supreme Court partially
replaced Watchman’s analysis of a community’s social, physical
and legal contours with a bright-line rule. Under Venetie’s twostep test, a dependent Indian community’s land must (1) have
been set aside by the federal government for the benefit of
Indians, and (2) the federal government must provide
sufficient superintendence over the land.75 In Venetie, because
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act extinguished tribes’
aboriginal title and enabled non-Indians to own former
68. Id. at 1534–36.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885 (D.S.D. 1991) (holding that a
dependent Indian community exists where homes were built with federal funds and
preferences for leasing were given to tribal members satisfied the “federal set aside”
requirement and the provision of tribal services in the housing community satisfied
the “cohesiveness” requirement); Mound v. Spotted Horse, 477 F. Supp. 156, 160
(D.S.D. 1979) (applying a four-factor analysis similar to Watchman); United States v.
Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (1971) (examining the area in question, the relationship
between the tribal community, the tribe and the federal government, and federal
agencies’ treatment of the community).
70. Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1542–43.
71. Id. at 1543.
72. Id. at 1546.
73. Id. at 1545.
74. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t (Venetie), 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
75. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 530–31. Cf. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 7 (1942) (defining dependent Indian communities as “any lands occupied by
‘distinctly Indian communities’ recognized and treated by the Government as
‘dependent communities’ entitled to protection”).

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss2/4

14

Newman: Creating an Environmental No-Man's Land: The Tenth Circuit's Depa

366 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:2

reservation land, the Village of Venetie failed to meet the
federal set-aside requirement.76 In addition, the Court decided
that the federal government’s provision of “health, social,
welfare and economic programs,” did not amount to “federal
superintendence”—a tribal-federal relationship the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act specifically sought to avoid.77
Lower courts partially distinguished Venetie on two grounds.
First, Venetie’s analysis turned on the distinct purpose of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act to extinguish tribes’
aboriginal title and did not intend to address Indian country
status in areas outside of Alaska, such as New Mexico’s
Pueblos.78 Second, Venetie did not expressly discuss or overrule
Watchman’s community of reference test.79 As a result, Venetie
did not end debate regarding the “land in question” from which
to begin the dependent Indian community analysis.80 For
instance, in United States v. Arrieta81 and State v. Romero,82
the courts looked to the larger Pueblo as the relevant “land in
question,” and held that a county road and privately-owned fee
land, respectively, were part of dependent Indian communities
due to their location within or between Pueblos.83 Despite the
Supreme Court’s best efforts, dependent Indian communities
defy simple designation.
3.

The Landscape of Navajo Nation’s Church Rock Chapter

Federal land policy left an indelible mark on land status in
the Church Rock Chapter. During the late nineteenth century,
the federal government granted railroad companies

76. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 533.
77. Id. at 533–34.
78. See Romero, 142 P.3d at 891 (N.M. 2006); Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 591,
599–600 (N.M. 2009).
79. See United States v. Arrieta, 436 F.3d 1246, 1249–51 (10th Cir. 2006) (state
highway right-of-way within the exterior boundaries of a Pueblo, surrounded on both
sides by non-Indian fee land, falls within a dependent Indian community); Romero,
142 P.3d at 891–95 (non-Indian owned fee lands within a Pueblo fall within a
dependent Indian community).
80. Hydro Res. Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224,
1249 (10th 2000) (rev’d on other grounds, HRI III, 608 F.3d 1331 (2010) (en banc 6-5
decision)) .
81. Arrieta, 436 F.3d at 1250–51.
82. Romero, 142 P.3d at 887.
83. Arrieta, 436 F.3d at 1249–51; Romero, 142 P.3d at 891–95.
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alternating parcels of land adjacent to the reservation.84 When
it became clear that private, non-Indian landowners were
appropriating scarce water resources, the government changed
course and added land to the reservation, while preserving
existing non-Indian property rights.85 In 1911, the government
changed course again, opening unallotted lands for sale to the
public.86 In 1928, Congress reversed course once again,
purchasing former railroad tracts to be held in trust for the
benefit of the Navajo.87 In this way, the federal government’s
land policies caused extreme checkerboarding in the Church
Rock Chapter and created the jurisdictional quagmire the HRI
III court sought to reconcile.
Of the Church Rock Chapter’s 57,000 acres, the federal
government holds fifty-two percent in trust for the Navajo
Nation and twenty-six percent in trust for individual Indians.88
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) owns ten percent of
the land, subject to grazing permits granted to Navajos.89
Thus, the federal government owns a total of eighty-eight
percent of the land used or occupied by Navajos.90 Of the
remaining land, private landowners own six percent and the
State of New Mexico owns four percent.91
The Chapter is divided into sections, of which HRI owns one
parcel in Section 8 in fee and owns subsurface rights to the
adjacent parcel in Section 17 (the locus of the dispute in
Morris).92 Together, HRI’s two parcels contain 7.8 tons of
uranium—nearly a quarter of its total uranium holdings in
New Mexico.93 HRI’s 160 acre parcel is located in the southeast
quadrant of Section 8, adjacent to the southern and eastern
84. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1136.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1168, 1180 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting that land ownership estimates are
precise within 2.4 percent). The HRI II court estimated federal ownership to be ninetytwo percent of land in the Chapter. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 562 F.3d 1249, 1267 (10th Cir. 2009).
91. Id. at 1168 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1157; Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677,
705 (10th Cir. 2010).
93. URANIUM RESOURCES, INC., http://www.uraniumresources.com (last visited Jan.
27, 2011).
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boundaries of Navajo Nation’s reservation.94 The neighboring
three quadrants in Section 8 are held in trust for Navajo
whose grazing permits there span multiple contiguous
sections.95 Section 8 also sits above the Westwater Canyon
Aquifer, which provides potable water to approximately 12,000
people living in the eastern half of the reservation.96 The
aquifer meets primary Safe Drinking Water Act SDWA
standards.97
The Navajo Nation and the federal government dominate
economic, political and cultural life of the Church Rock
Chapter. In 1927, the Bureau of Indian Affairs divided the
Navajo tribal government into Chapters, which were later
certified by the Tribe and approved by the Department of the
Interior (DOI).98 The Chapter House, built by local Navajo in
1946, is the social and political center of the Chapter and offers
a Head Start program, an elementary school, churches, and
other social and health facilities.99 Of the Chapter’s 2,802
residents, ninety-eight percent are Navajo, and eighty-eight
percent of residents frequent the Chapter House at least once a
month.100
“The Navajo Nation provides housing, electricity, drinking
water, wastewater treatment, sewer services and utilities, as
well as police protection to the residents of the Chapter, and
the Chapter itself provides scholarships, home repair and

94. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1136–39 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1168–69 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting Section 8’s integration with
surrounding land sections).
96. Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustainability and Globalization: Charting the
Future of Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. &
POL’Y J. 188, 224 (2009); Southwest Research and Information Center, Facts and
History
About:
HRI’s
Crownpoint
Uranium
Solution
Mining
Project,
http://www.sric.org/uranium/CUPstat.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
97. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1161, 1179 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting that Westwater
Canyon water is “outstanding”); Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 10 Morris v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007
WL 4732316 at 16 (noting that according to the final environmental impact statement,
water from the Westwater Canyon Aquifer meets New Mexico’s drinking water
standards).
98. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1137; EPA’s Supplemental Brief for the En Banc Court at 28
n. 18 Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131
(2010) (No. 07-9506), 2009 WL 3375299.
99. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1169 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
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purchase assistance, and meals for seniors.”101 The federal
government provides road maintenance, grazing management
and social and health services.102 Finally, the local
Superintendent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs asserted that
the Navajo people living in the Chapter rely “primarily” upon
federal and tribal services.103 McKinley County, in which the
Church Rock Chapter is located, “provides essential public
services to [the] private lands,” which comprise six percent of
Church Rock Chapter; HRI pays annual property taxes on its
land to the County.104
4.

The HRI III Decision

The jurisdictional dispute over HRI’s land began in 1988
when HRI applied to the State of New Mexico for a permit to
begin uranium mining.105 HRI assumed that because its
proposed operation was on private land, it should seek a
SDWA permit from the State of New Mexico106 under the
State’s Underground Injection Control (UIC) program.107
Because HRI’s land was surrounded by trust lands, however,
the EPA argued that the site fell within a “dependent Indian
communit[y].”108 Prior to HRI III, the Tenth Circuit held in
HRI II, that Section 8 was part of a dependent Indian
community.109 HRI petitioned for en banc review, contending
that Venetie had eliminated Watchman’s “community of
reference” test employed in HRI II.110 In HRI III, the court
considered the validity of the EPA’s Land Status
Determination, in which the EPA affirmed Section 8’s status
as a dependent Indian community.111 Reversing its decision
from the previous year in HRI II, the en banc court vacated the
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1137.
105. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677,
681–682 (10th Cir. 2010).
106. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1169 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1139–40.
108. Id. at 1142–44.
109. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI II), 562 F.3d 1249,
1267 (10th Cir. 2009).
110. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1135.
111. Id. at 1142–43.
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EPA’s Land Status Determination and held that Section 8 did
not meet the requirements of a dependent Indian community
after all.112
By holding that Venetie had eliminated the “community of
reference” test, the HRI III court narrowed the scope of its
dependent Indian community analysis and decided that the
appropriate “land in question” was HRI’s land parcel, in
isolation from the rest of Section 8 and the Chapter.113
Although the Venetie Court did not address the community of
reference issue or the status of non-Indian fee land in
dependent Indian communities,114 the HRI III court
determined that the community of reference test had been
eliminated and that HRI’s parcel was the appropriate “land in
question.”115
The HRI III court then examined HRI’s parcel in terms of
Venetie’s federal set-aside and federal superintendence tests.
Because HRI’s land was held in fee-simple, the court decided
the land was not “set-aside” for Indians.116 The court’s
interpretation of the “set-aside” requirement depends solely on
land title, despite Supreme Court precedent stating that the
status of dependent Indian communities should be analyzed in
the light most favorable to its Indian inhabitants,117 and that
“Congress has defined Indian country broadly.”118 When the
court isolates its analysis to HRI’s parcel, only HRI’s taxes to
McKinley County and the County’s maintenance of a road to
Section 8 is relevant, while federal superintendence of eighty-

112. Id. at 1166.
113. Id. at 1149.
114. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224,
1241 (10th Cir. 2000) (rev’d on other grounds, HRI III, 608 F.3d 1331 (2010) (en banc
6-5 decision)).
115. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1152–53.
116. Id. at 1148–49.
117. In McGowan, one of two cases on which 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) is premised, the
Court stated, “[w]hen we view the facts of this case in the light of the relationship
which has long existed between the government and the Indians-and which continues
to date it is not reasonably possible to draw any distinction between this Indian
‘colony’ and ‘Indian country.’” United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938).
118. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n. v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993). See also
Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 457 (1989) (3-2-3 opinion) (“[O]nce the tribe’s
valid regulatory interest is established, the nature of land ownership does not
diminish the tribe’s inherent power to regulate in the area.”).
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eight percent of the surrounding land becomes insignificant.119
In dissent, Judge Ebel joined by four other judges stated, “it
is difficult to imagine a situation in which a piece of property
owned in fee by a private individual, examined in isolation
from the community in which the parcel of land is located
could meet these two criteria.”120 By adopting Venetie, the
court significantly altered its reading of prior dependent
Indian community doctrine.
5.

Critique of the Court’s Reasoning

The Tenth Circuit’s decision that HRI’s parcel in Section 8 is
not part of a dependent Indian community is erroneous for
three reasons: (1) the court misinterpreted the Indian country
statute; (2) the court overstepped Supreme Court precedent set
out in Venetie and misread subsequent case law; and (3) the
court undermined the historic approach and current federal
policy governing jurisdiction in Indian country. The court’s
reasoning also proceeds from three flawed assumptions: that
Indian country can expand uncontrollably; that the Watchman
test was “outcome determinative;” and that a titledeterminative approach to dependent Indian communities will
advance the goal of administrative expedience.
First, by tying dependent Indian community status to land
title, the HRI III court misinterprets the Indian country
statute by reading the term “community” out of the statute.
Sections 1151(a) (Indian reservations) and 1151(c) (Indian
allotments) of the Indian county statutes pecifically reference
land title, however, 1151(b) (dependent Indian communities)
does not.121 This difference demonstrates that Congress
understood the importance of land title and intentionally
119. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1169.
120. Id. at 1173 n.3 (Ebel, J., dissenting). See Judith V. Royster, Decontextualizing
Federal Indian Law: The Supreme Court’s 1997-998 Term, 34 TULSA L.J. 329, 342–43
(1999) (concluding that Venetie “all-but require[s] trust status for lands to be
considered a dependent Indian community”).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1151 (“[t]he term “Indian country”, . . . means (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including the rights-ofway running through the reservation,” (b) all dependent Indian communities within
the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state,” (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same.”).
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exempted land title from the definition of a dependent Indian
community. Not only does the court’s interpretation render the
word “community” superfluous, contrary to traditional
methods of statutory interpretation,122 it effectively negates
recognition of any dependent Indian community that is not a
Pueblo or “Indian colony.”123 Aside from Pueblos, in the Tenth
Circuit, going forward, Indian allotments are likely the only
areas of “Indian country” that can exist outside of a
reservation.
The HRI III court’s title-determinative approach to
dependent Indian communities rests on the assumption that
such an approach will promote “administrative simplicity.”124
According to the court, Venetie rightfully replaced Watchman’s
community of reference test because it “ensure[s] that the
boundaries of dependent Indian communities will be precisely
and predictably defined.”125 The court reasons that because
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as a criminal statute,
predictability to ensure “fair warning” is of the highest
importance.126 Yet, as the dissent points out, subtracting slices
of private land from Indian country causes jurisdiction to
alternate every few acres, which will increase confusion among
law enforcement agents, rather than advancing administrative
expedience.127 If checkerboard lands created the jurisdictional
complexity that led to the instant dispute, perpetuating
checkerboarding defies logic.128 Finally, the court promotes
administrative expedience primarily for HRI’s benefit:
“[S]imple jurisdictional rules . . . promote greater predictability
[, which] is valuable to corporations making business and

122. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1170 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at1170–72.
124. Id. at 1159.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1160.
127. Id. at 1172–73 (Ebel, J., dissenting); EPA’s Supplemental Brief for the En Banc
Court at 9–14 Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d
1131 (2010) (No. 07-9506), 2009 WL 3375299. See Garcia v. Gutierrez, 217 P.3d 597,
602 (N.M. 2009) (“In the criminal context, Section 1151’s ‘Indian country’ designation
provides necessary homogenizing force, creating uniformity out of the sometimes
chaotic jumble of land titles on, near, and within tribal boundaries.”); Seymour v.
Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) (holding
that Congress’s intent in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1151 was to avoid checkerboard
jurisdiction).
128. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1173–74 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
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investment decisions.”129 In the end, the HRI III court’s titledeterminative approach misinterprets § 1151(b) and is
motivated by the false assumption that that approach will lead
to greater administrative expedience.
Second, HRI III’s title-determinative approach oversteps
Supreme Court precedent set out in Venetie and misreads
subsequent case law.130 If the Sandoval Court had employed a
title-determinative approach, it could not have recognized
Pueblos as a dependent Indian community.131 In addition, the
Venetie court did not explain how courts should determine to
which land the two-step test should be applied.132 And,
contrary to HRI III, the Venetie Court examined the entire
Native Village of Venetie, not only the land from which the
dispute arose.133 The Venetie court did not purport to address
anything other than the status of lands held by Native villages
in Alaska under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
much less dependent Indian communities adjacent to
reservations.134
Finally, although the HRI III court’s decision formally rests
on land title in isolation from other community-specific facts,
the court found compelling that HRI’s parcel in Section 8 was
129. Id. at 1160 n.23 (alterations in original) (quoting Hertz Corp v. Friend, ___ U.S.
___, 130 S.Ct 1181, 1193 (2010)).
130. See also Royster, supra note 120 (arguing that Venetie shifted the 18 U.S.C. §
1151 doctrine dramatically and unnecessarily).
131. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913).
132. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1175 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1170–72 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (“One would therefore expect, if it were
following the [HRI III] majority’s analysis, that the Venetie Court would have narrowly
considered whether just the land on which the school was to be built was a dependent
Indian community. But the Court decidedly did not do so. Instead, the Court in Venetie
looked at all of the land that previously composed the Venetie Reservation-not just the
site of the proposed school-to determine whether that land constituted a dependent
Indian community. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523, 118 S.Ct. 948.” (emphasis in original)).
134. See State v. Romero, 142 P.3d 887, 891 (N.M. 2006) (noting that in deciding
Venetie, the Supreme Court had “specific Alaskan facts in mind” and that Venetie did
not consider “the unique circumstances of New Mexico’s Pueblos”). The HRI III court
criticizes Watchman’s community of reference test is “outcome determinative” in favor
of tribes. (See HRI III 608 F.3d at 1154). Ironically, the Venetie test is similarly
“outcome determinative” because a court must first determine to which land it will
apply the two-step test. A court’s discretionary selection of the “land in question” is a
normative, rather than an objective, process. For example, will a court choose to look
at the entire scope of tribal lands, as in Venetie and Arrieta? Or will a court restrict its
examination to the discrete parcel being claimed? (See Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie Tribal Gov’t (Venetie), 522 U.S. 520, 521–22, 534 (1998)). The question,
therefore, is how the court will conduct this normative analysis.
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“rugged,” “isolated” and “uninhabited.”135 Yet, what percentage
of Navajo land is “inhabited?” If land is rugged and isolated, it
still may be valuable for activities other than resource
extraction, such as grazing or harvesting traditional medicine,
among other cultural and economic activities. The court’s
assumption that valuable land must be inhabited reveals its
pro-development bias and fails to recognize the value of
Church Rock’s land in the eyes of ninety-eight percent of HRI’s
neighbors.136 Thus, contrary to the court’s own preference for a
title-determinative analysis, these community-specific factors
creep into the majority’s analysis.
Third, HRI III undermines the historic approach and
current policies governing Indian country status. The HRI III
court’s reasoning proceeds from an antiquated, allotment era
perspective. Congress abandoned allotment policy and strove
to mitigate its damage with the adoption of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 and Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act in 1975.137 As Judge Ebel’s dissent
points out, the purpose of § 1151 was to avoid checkerboard
jurisdiction, not further it.138 Indian law scholar, Dean Suagee,
aptly notes that the “congressional intent of the allotment era
135. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1138, 1143.
136. Note that when courts diminish reservation boundaries, they do not hesitate to
look at the “Indian character of the land” to make their determination. Compare Solem
v. Bartlett 465 U.S. 463, 471–72, 480 (1984) (holding that after land was opened to
settlement, the land had not lost its “Indian character,” but also “[w]hen an area is
predominately populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian
allotments, finding that the land remains Indian country seriously burdens the
administration of state and local governments.”) with Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399,
420–21 (1994) (looking to the area’s eighty-five percent non-Indian population to find
that the area had lost its Indian character). According to land ownership, population
and service provision, the Church Rock Chapter has undeniably retained its “Indian
character.”
137. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Seattle University Symposium, Perspectives on Tribal
Land Acquisition, 9 (Jun. 3, 2010) (transcript available in the Seattle University
School of Law Library) (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act (25 U.S.C. § 465) as
a recognition of the failure of the allotment era); Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–458 (2006). But see Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 423 (1989)
(noting that “[a]lthough the [IRA] may have ended the allotment of further lands, it
did not restore to the Indians the exclusive use of those lands that had already passed
to non-Indians…).
138. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1172 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting that in Seymour v.
Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358, the Supreme Court
explicitly denounced “such an impractical pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction” and
that checkerboarding “was avoided by the plain language of § 1151.”).

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011

23

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4

2011]

CREATING AN ENVIRONMENTAL NO-MAN’S LAND

375

should be irrelevant because during that era, there was no
body of environmental protection law, and so Congress would
not have given any thought to how allotment era legislation
would affect the implementation of federal environmental
laws.”139 In essence, employing an allotment era perspective in
the resolution of modern tribal resource conflicts is analogous
to applying Jim Crow laws to resolve modern racial zoning
conflicts. Instead, courts should effectuate Indian selfdetermination,140 according to which tribes may assume
primary authority for environmental protection in their
communities.141
Lastly, the HRI III decision reflects Judge Frizzell’s lone
dissent in HRI II. He cautioned that with the application of the
community of reference test “we take an unprecedented step.
Never before has non-Indian fee land outside the exterior
boundaries of a reservation or Pueblo been held to be a
dependent Indian community.”142 From Judge Frizzell’s
perspective, the Watchman test was “outcome determinative,”
Indian country threatens to grow uncontrollably, and it will
inevitably encroach upon private, non-Indian land. The HRI
III majority adopts this assumption, stating that “land that
once wasn’t Indian country becomes Indian country by tribal
preference or judicial decree rather than congressional
action.”143 These statements are inaccurate. In fact, the courts
have diminished reservation boundaries, wiping out large
swaths of land formerly under tribal jurisdiction144 and tribes’
139. Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court’s “Whack-a-Mole” Game Theory in Federal
Indian Law, a Theory that has No Place in the Realm of Environmental Law, 7 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 90, 112–14 (2002).
140. There are numerous statutes which incorporate the “self-determination” model
of tribal-federal relations. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–458 (2006) and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1377 (2006).
141. President Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs 213 (Jul. 8,
1970) (“We have concluded that Indians will get better programs and that public
monies will be more effectively expended if the people who are most affected by these
programs are responsible for operating them.”). See also discussion of EPA’s Indian
Policy and “treatment as state” programs in Part III, infra; Rebecca Tsosie, supra note
7 at 330 (“True environmental self-determination, however, depends upon the ability
of Indian nations to preserve their landbases and engage in economic development
according to their own policies and values.”).
142. HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1143 (quoting HRI II, 562 F.3d 1249, 1270–71 (10th Cir.
2009) (Frizzell, J., dissenting in part)).
143. Id. at 1153.
144. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v.
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petitions to the Secretary of Interior to take land back into
trust status are severely delayed or denied all together.145
Furthermore, Sandoval146 and Martine147 specifically assuaged
fear that tribal or Indian country status would be designated
arbitrarily and directed that any change to dependent Indian
community status must come from Congress, not the courts.
The net effect of the HRI III court’s assumptions is to
eliminate a sub-category of Indian country—dependent Indian
communities located outside the exterior boundaries of a
reservation.148 The court’s focus on land title obscures any
consideration of Church Rock community’s legitimate concerns
about the safety of its drinking water.149 Instead, as discussed
in Part III infra, the HRI III court ensured that neither tribal
government, state government, nor the federal government
would be directly accountable to the Church Rock community.
B.

Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

In Morris, the Tenth Circuit upheld the decision of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to grant a source
materials license to HRI for its uranium mining operation on
Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 414 (1994).
145. In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act, which authorized DOI
to take land into trust status under certain conditions. Conflict over DOI’s criteria for
taking land into trust, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision in Carcieri v. Salazar,
555 U.S. 379 (2009), have severely complicated the process. See generally Amanda D.
Hettler, Beyond A Carcieri Fix: The Need For Broader Reform of The Land-Into-Trust,
96 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1387– 1391, (May, 2011). See also NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
AMERICAN INDIANS, LAND INTO TRUST (2010) http://www.ncai.org/fileadmin/ncai_
events/2010_WH_Summit/2a_-_Land_into _trust_-_FINAL.pdf.
146. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
Of course it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body of
people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe,
but only that in respect of distinctly Indian communities, the question whether, to
what extent, and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as
dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of the United States
are to be determined by Congress, and not by the courts.
Id.
147. United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1971).
148. See HRI III, 608 F.3d 1131, 1173 n.3 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (noting, “it is difficult
to imagine a situation in which a piece of property owned in fee by a private
individual, examined in isolation from the community in which the parcel of land is
located could meet these two criteria”); Royster, supra note 130.
149. Contra HRI III, 608 F.3d at 1179–81, 1184–86 (10th Cir. 2010) (Lucero J. and
Henry J., dissenting) (noting the reliance of the Church Rock community on the
Westwater Canyon Aquifer for drinking water and the likelihood that contamination
from mining would endanger surrounding communities).
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Section 17 land in the Church Rock Chapter of the Navajo
Nation.150 The court made this decision despite radiation levels
already above the public exposure limit and without certainty
that HRI could restore contaminated groundwater to drinking
water quality.151 In a two to one decision, the Tenth Circuit
decided that because HRI’s uranium mining would only
increase rates of radiation by a negligible amount, and because
HRI would “likely” and “eventually” be able to restore the
groundwater to some degree, NRC did not err in granting HRI
a license to proceed with the mining.152 A brief review of the
history of uranium mining in Navajo country provides the
necessary context to the court’s decision. This review offers a
single source for historical data otherwise found in various law
review articles, congressional testimony and books.
1.

The History of Uranium Mining and Its Impact on Navajo
Country

Since the 1940s, the United States and private companies
have extracted large amounts of uranium from over 500
uranium mines within the Navajo Nation.153 In 1975, the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights described the Navajo Nation as an
“energy colony.”154 Despite some environmental remediation by
the federal government, large amounts of mining tailings and
waste remain exposed and compromise local air and water
quality and the health of Church Rock Chapter’s residents.155
a.

Strip Mining in Navajo Country

In the Navajo Nation, the federal government found a
favorable environment to seed its nuclear weapons program—a
150. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677,
705 (10th Cir. 2010).
151. Id. at 691–694, 697, 700, 704.
152. Id.
153. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9); Bradford Cooley, The Navajo
Uranium Ban: Tribal Sovereignty v. National Energy Demands, 26 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393, 395 (2006).
154. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Navajo Nation: An American Colony
(1975), cited in Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of George Arthur,
Chairman Resources Committee Navajo Nation Council).
155. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9); Cooley, supra note 153, at 395.
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place rich in uranium, with few environmental, health and
safety regulations, and a place with readily available, cheap
labor close to the mineral source.156 Between 1944 and 1986,
the government and private companies extracted nearly four
million tons of uranium ore from over 500 mines in Navajo
Country—all of which was blasted, hauled and processed by
Navajo miners.157 By the 1960s, one half of all uranium miners
in the country, roughly 1,500, were employed in New Mexico’s
uranium mines.158 Many Navajo recall growing up in mining
camps, drinking water and inhaling dust from poorly
ventilated mines, while family members washed contaminated
clothing and used mining implements at home.159
Two factors significantly slowed states’ and the federal
government’s response to known dangers surrounding
uranium mining. First, although scientists had been aware of
the link between uranium mining and low life expectancy
among European miners since the sixteenth century, debate
about the causal connection between the two continued
throughout the first half of the twentieth century and stymied
regulatory progress.160 Second, neither states nor the federal
government assumed responsibility for establishing mine
safety standards.161 In effect, the uranium boom came and
went without the imposition of substantive safety standards to
protect uranium miners or their families.162 One court noted
that Utah, Arizona and New Mexico did “little or nothing” to
improve conditions in their uranium mines.163 As a result,
rates of exposure in some mines were one thousand times the
maximum level recommended by the Public Health Service
(PHS) and exceeded radiation doses from the atomic bombs in
Japan.164

156. Bradford Cooley, supra note 153 at 395.
157. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9); Cooley, supra note 153, at 395.
158. Begay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Ariz. 1984).
159. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Phil Harrison, Navajo
Nation Council Member).
160. Begay, 591 F. Supp. at 991–92, 1005, 1011.
161. Id. at 1001, 1009.
162. In 1967, for the first time, the Secretary of Labor established safety and health
standards for uranium mining. Id. at 1004, 1009.
163. Id. at 1007.
164. Id.
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The single most devastating event occurred in 1979, several
months after the accident at Three Mile Island, when a mud
dam retaining uranium slurry burst.165 As a result, ninety-four
million gallons of radioactive wastewater and 1100 tons of
radioactive and toxic uranium waste entered the Puerco River,
a main source of drinking water in Church Rock.166 Although
the spill was far larger than that at Three Mile Island, the
accident remains largely unknown, and its health effects are
still unfolding.167
Finally, in 1984, 200 Navajo miners sued several federal
agencies for failing to warn them of the dangers of the
uranium mining that they alleged caused them to contract
various illnesses.168 Evidence indicated that PHS did not
inform the miners of health risks associated with uranium
mining because they were concerned about disrupting the
work force and the potential difficulty of replacing workers
given that the “fear of cancer . . . would seriously interrupt
badly needed production of uranium.”169 When the court denied
the miners’ claim,170 Congress adopted the Radiation Exposure
Compensation Act in 1990.171 Obtaining actual compensation,
however, has proven an uphill battle for many former Navajo
miners.172
b.

The Impact of Incomplete Remediation on Public Health
and the Environment
The federal government closed the Church Rock mine after

165. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Doug Brugge, Professor
of Public Health at Tufts University School of Medicine).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Begay, 591 F. Supp. at 993.
169. Cooley, supra note 153 at 395 (quoting, Begay, 591 F. Supp. at 995). PHS
decided not to warn miners of the potential radiation from uranium mining in order to
ensure miners’ participation in the study and mine owners’ cooperation. Begay, 591 F.
Supp. at 995.
170. Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059, 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 1985) (The court
denied the miners’ claims because PHS’s decision not to warn the miners fell within
the “discretionary function exception” of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2680(a), which bars claims against the United States for acts or omissions of its
employees that are discretionary, even when that discretion is abused.).
171. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, 28 C.F.R. § 79 (2001).
172. Compensation of Navajo Uranium Miners, WORLD INFORMATION SERVICE ON
ENERGY, http://www.wise-uranium.org/ureca.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
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the United Nuclear Corporation abandoned it in 1982—before
the company had undertaken environmental remediation.173
The EPA has determined that the scope of environmental
remediation in Navajo Country encompasses over 500
abandoned uranium mines and 1000 potential remediation
sites across an area the size of West Virginia.174 To date, the
Department of Energy (DOE) has “decommissioned” four
uranium processing sites.175 This process involves capping the
mine shafts, containing tailings, posting public warning signs
and remediating groundwater.176
Although current environmental regulations require
landfills to be lined to avoid groundwater contamination,177
United Nuclear disposed of its mine waste by dumping soft
tailings (slurry) into unlined ponds and by piling solid tailings
beside each mine.178 As a result, mine tailings sit uncovered in
unlined ponds and stand sixty to seventy feet tall. The
consequences of these disposal practices are many. Dust from
piles of mine tailings blow into nearby bodies of water, grazing
lands and homes, carrying with it radiation from radon gas
and toxic carcinogens.179 Consequently, Navajo livestock,
which local residents consume and sell, are exposed to
radiation and toxic substances as they graze amidst tailings

173. See Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677,
705 (10th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., dissenting); Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 10
Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 079505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 15.
174. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9). See Health and Environmental
Impacts of Uranium Contamination in the Navajo Nation Five-Year Plan as Requested
by H. Committee on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, U.S. ENTL. PROT. AGENCY, 4 (Jun. 9,
2008), http://www.epa.gov/region9/superfund/navajo-nation/ (follow link to “Five Year
Plan”).
175. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Stephen Etsitty,
Executive Director of the Navajo Nation Envtl. Prot. Agency).
176. Id.
177. Id. (statement of statement of Stephen Etsitty, Executive Director of the Navajo
Nation Envtl. Prot. Agency and statement of George Arthur, Chairman Resources
Committee Navajo Nation Council).
178. Paul Robinson, Uranium Mill Tailings Remediation Performed by US DOE, SW.
RESEARCH AND INFO. CENTER 9 (2004), available at http://www.vbgov.com
/government/departments/public-utilities/Documents/08.DOE_Overview_Uranium
_Tailing_Remediation.pdf.
179. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Ray Manygoats and
Edith Hood, Navajo tribal members).
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piles and drink from slurry pools.180 In 2007, Church Rock
residents testified in Congress that children play in tailings
piles and suffer skin burns from contact with highly
contaminated water.181 In addition, various cancers (including
lung cancer, bone cancer, cancer of the sinuses, leukemia and
skin cancer), kidney failure, miscarriages, lymphoma, birth
defects, neurotoxicity, respiratory illnesses and skin diseases
are frequent in neighboring Navajo communities.182 Medical
researchers have traced these illnesses to gamma radiation,
heavy metals and toxins associated with uranium mining
waste.183 Finally, uranium mine tailings contain high levels of
heavy metals such as selenium, molybdenum, cadmium,
arsenic and lead, as well as chloride, nitrate, ammonia and
sulfate that can seep into surface or groundwater and can
contaminate drinking water.184
While the federal government highlights the exorbitant cost
of compensating former miners and of environmental
remediation,185 it has “forgotten” uranium mining’s
concomitant benefit to national security and the energy
industry.186 Unfortunately, these benefits have come at a high
cost to the Navajo people.
c.

The Navajo Nation’s Moratorium on Uranium Mining and
Community Remediation Efforts
We are still undergoing what appears to be a neverending federal experiment to see how much devastation
can be endured by a people . . . from exposure to
radiation in the air, in the water, in the mines and on

180. See id. (statement of Ray Manygoats, Navajo tribal member).
181. See id. (statement of Phil Harrison, Navajo Nation Council Member and Edith
Hood, Navajo tribal member).
182. See id (Stephen Etsitty, Executive Director of the Navajo Nation Envtl. Prot.
Agency and Doug Brugge, Professor of Public Health at Tufts University School of
Medicine).
183. See id. (statement of Stephen Etsitty, Executive Director of the Navajo Nation
Envtl. Prot. Agency and Doug Brugge, Professor of Public Health at Tufts University
School of Medicine). See also Robinson, supra note 178, at 11–12; Cong. Hearing on
Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of David Geiser, Deputy Director, Office of Legacy
Management, Dep’t of Energy).
184. Robinson, supra note 178, at 11.
185. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of Wayne Nastri, Regional
Administrator U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency – Region 9).
186. Begay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 1011 (D. Ariz. 1984).
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the surface of the land. We are unwilling to be subjects
of that ongoing experiment any longer.187
In response to the Bush administration’s reinvigoration of
America’s nuclear energy program,188 the Navajo Nation
Council enacted the Diné Natural Resources Protection Act of
2005.189 The Act places a moratorium on uranium mining “on
any sites within Navajo Indian Country as defined by Title 7 of
Navajo Nation Code Section 254 and 18 U.S.C. § 1151”190 and
provides Navajos with the right to a healthy environment.191
The Act also codifies traditional Navajo beliefs that warn
against the disturbance of harmful substances.192 The
moratorium is supported by a description of the cost of
uranium mining to residents, including diminished work
years, illness and death, the economic loss associated with
unproductive land, diminished property value
and
contaminated livestock.193 Finally, the Act forecasts that
“future [uranium] mining . . . will generate further economic
detriments to the Navajo Nation,” including remediation costs,
veterinary costs, loss of access to and use of vegetation and loss
of potable water supplies.194
In addition, when federal remediation efforts for uranium
damages were slow to come, the Church Rock Uranium Mining
Project (CRUMP), a community-based research, education and
monitoring organization, began its own remediation effort to
educate the local community and to advocate for
comprehensive remediation.195 CRUMP’s documentation of

187. Cong. Hearing on Uranium, supra note 1 (statement of George Arthur,
Chairman, Resources Committee, Navajo Nation Council member).
188. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16021–16025 (2006)
(establishing the “Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project”).
189. Diné Natural Resources Protection Act (DNRPA), 18 Navajo Nation Code §§
1301–1303 (2005).
190. Id. § 1302(A).
191. Id. § 1301(C) (“[i]t is the right and freedom of the people to be respected,
honored and protected with a healthy physical and mental environment”).
192. “[T]he people now know that uranium is one such substance and that its
extraction should be avoided as traditional practice and prohibited by Navajo law.” Id.
§ 1301(D).
193. Id. § 1301(E)–(F).
194. Id. § 1301(G).
195. CHRIS SCHUEY & MELINDA RONCA-BATTISTA, CHURCH ROCK URANIUM
MONITORING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE CHURCH ROCK URANIUM MONITORING PROJECT
iii, available at http://www.sric.org/uranium/CRUMPReportSummary.pdf.
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elevated radiation levels and contaminated water wells and
soils provided scientific evidence supporting the public health
risks and environmental damage that residents have reported
for years.196 Both the Navajo Nation and the Church Rock
community have responded to the effects of uranium mining to
ensure a safer future for the Navajo people.
2.

The Morris Decision

In Morris, the Tenth Circuit upheld NRC’s decision to grant
a source materials license for uranium mining to HRI.197 The
court accepted NRC’s determination that increased radiation
levels from HRI’s operation would be “negligible” and that HRI
could “probably” and “eventually” restore the groundwater to
drinking water quality.198 In essence, the court upheld only one
of the missions that the AEA imposes on NRC—to advance
uranium development—but failed to recognize NRC’s
concomitant obligation under the AEA—to deny licenses that
are “inimical to” public health.199
a. Morris’ Procedural Background
In 1984, the United Nuclear Corporation sold HRI its
mineral rights to Section 17 in the Church Rock Chapter, the
site of the Old Church Rock (uranium) Mine.200 Although the
mine shaft has been capped, HRI has recorded gamma
radiation levels seventeen to twenty-nine times higher than
“typical” radiation levels for the area due to the mine tailings
remaining there.201 Unlike Section 8, the federal government
holds Section 17 land in trust for the Navajo Nation and leases
it to three families who live and graze livestock there.202
Church Rock residents draw their drinking water from
fourteen wells within the Westwater Canyon Aquifer beneath

196. Id. at iv–v.
197. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677,
705 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S. Nov. 15 (2010) (Mem).
198. Id. at 691–93, 704.
199. Prohibitions against issuance of a license, 42 U.S.C. § 2099 (2006).
200. Morris, 598 F.3d at 705.
201. Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 10 Morris v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 15.
202. Morris, 598 F.3d at 708 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
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Section 17203 and 12,000 people living in the eastern portion of
the Navajo Nation can use the aquifer for drinking water,
grazing and agriculture.204
In 1988, HRI’s application for ISL mining at four sites in
Navajo Country, including Sections 8 and 17, triggered the
environmental impact statement (EIS) process.205 The Navajo
Nation declined to participate in the EIS in opposition to the
project.206 When Petitioners, a community organization,
environmental organization and two local ranchers,207 moved
to intervene in the EIS process, NRC approved their
intervention because they “use a substantial quantity of water
personally or for livestock” near the mining site.208 After
completing the final EIS (FEIS) in 1997, NRC, the Bureau of
Land Management and Bureau of Indian Affairs recommended
that NRC grant HRI’s license, which NRC did in 1998.209
b.

The Court Approved HRI’s License Despite Levels of
Radiation Above the Exposure Limit Set by the Atomic
Energy Act

The Morris court reviewed whether the conditions NRC’s
license imposed on HRI conformed to the AEA and its
regulations.210 The AEA prohibits NRC from granting a license
“if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license
to such person for such purpose would be inimical to the
common defense and security or the health and safety of the
public.”211 Although radiation levels from previous uranium
mining at Church Rock already exceed the safe limit for
human exposure, the Tenth Circuit upheld NRC’s decision to
grant a source materials license to HRI.212 The court’s decision
203. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131,
1179 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc 6-5 decision) (Ebel, J., dissenting).
204. Rebecca Tsosie, supra note 96.
205. Morris, 598 F.3d at 681–82.
206. Id. at 682 n.2.
207. Id. at 681. Petitioners include Eastern Diné Against Uranium Mining,
Southwest Research and Information Center, and two local ranchers, Grace Sam and
Marilyn Morris.
208. Id. at 682.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 694–95.
211. Prohibitions against issuance of a license, 42 U.S.C. § 2099 (2006).
212. Morris, 598 F.3d at 705.
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turned on its acceptance of (1) NRC’s interpretation of
“licensed operation” under the AEA’s implementing
regulations, and (2) NRC’s determination that HRI’s operation
would increase radiation levels only “negligibly,” and did not
constitute “cumulative impacts” under NEPA.213
In making its licensing decisions, the NRC must adhere to
the AEA’s public health standard—“total effective dose
equivalent” (TEDE)—the total allowable amount of radiation
that may be absorbed by an individual member of the public.214
The Petitioners in Morris disputed NRC’s interpretation of the
AEA and regulations, under which radiation from existing
mine waste was excluded from the TEDE calculation.
AEA regulations authorize NRC to:
[c]ontrol the receipt, possession, use, transfer, and
disposal of licensed material by any licensee in such a
manner that the total dose to an individual (including
doses resulting from licensed and unlicensed
radioactive material from radiation sources other than
background radiation) does not exceed the standards for
protection against radiation prescribed in the
regulations in this part.215
Section 20.1301 of the AEA requires each licensee to conduct
operations “so that the total effective dose equivalent to
individual members of the public from the licensed operation
does not exceed 0.1 rem (1 mSv) in a year.” Notably,
“background radiation” is excluded from the TEDE calculation.
Section 20.1003 defines background radiation as:
radiation from cosmic sources; naturally occurring
radioactive material . . . and global fallout as it exists in
the environment from the testing of nuclear explosive
devices or from past nuclear accidents. . . and are not
under the control of the licensee. ‘Background radiation’
does not include radiation from source, byproduct or
special
nuclear
materials
regulated
by
the
Commission.216
NRC argued that because HRI was not responsible for
producing the existing mine waste on Section 17, the mine
213. Id. at 687, 690, 693.
214. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1003 (2011) (definitions).
215. Id. § 20.1001(b) (purpose).
216. Id. § 20.1003 (definitions).
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waste was not within its control, and thus, the mine waste was
not part of the “licensed operation” to which the TEDE
applies.217 NRC’s assertion contradicts its earlier finding that
the mine waste at Section 17 fell under HRI’s control because
the chain of title includes the acts of the prior land owner.218
However, background radiation is the only material exempt
from the TEDE calculation and existing mine waste is not
included in its definition. As Judge Lucero pointed out in his
dissent, NRC’s narrow focus on the “licensed operation”
conflicts with § 20.1301’s exclusion of “background
radiation.”219 If TEDE was only meant to apply to the licensed
operation, then excluding “background radiation” would be
superfluous, contrary to established principles of statutory
interpretation.220
Nevertheless,
without
offering
an
explanation, the court upheld NRC’s exclusion of existing
radiation at Section 17 because it “makes sense in its own
right.”221
The Petitioners’ argument that NRC’s interpretation of the
AEA and associated regulations is inconsistent with previous
interpretations is compelling.222 For example, NRC previously
acknowledged in the FEIS that “[r]adiological effects during
project construction would include natural background plus
remnant radiation stemming from previous mining and milling
activities near the Church Rock site.”223 Due to NRC’s internal
inconsistency and questionable resolution of difficult scientific
issues, Judge Lucero argues that NRC’s interpretation of its
regulations does not warrant the court’s absolute deference.224
Even if NRC’s calculation of TEDE is limited to the “licensed
operation,” AEA regulations authorize NRC to impose
protective measures when necessary.225 The purpose of NRC’s
regulations echoes the AEA’s broad “inimical to” public health
217. Morris, 598 F.3d at 688.
218. Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 17 Morris v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 38–9.
219. Morris, 598 F.3d at 706 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 705 (Lucero, J. dissenting).
221. Id. at 687, 690 n.13.
222. Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 22–3 Morris v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 60–63.
223. Morris, 598 F.3d at 691–92.
224. Id. at 705 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
225. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1001(b) (2006).
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standard: “nothing in this part shall be construed as limiting
actions that may be necessary to protect health and safety.”226
This means that NRC could condition HRI’s license on its
remediation of existing mine waste at Section 17 before or
concurrent with its operations, as the FEIS required.227 The
court’s limited focus on NRC’s regulation of “licensed material”
obscures other available protective measures. Ultimately, the
human body cannot discriminate between licensed and
unlicensed sources of radioactive material.
Second, the court accepted NRC’s finding that the expected
increase in radiation at Section 17 would be “negligible” and
rejected Petitioners’ claim that NRC failed to take a “hard
look” at the “cumulative impacts”228 of HRI’s uranium
mining.229 This conclusion is plausible only by ignoring the
already elevated levels of radiation at Section 17. In addition,
NRC’s negligible impacts conclusion is based on HRI’s ISL
method of uranium mining that “does not result in large
amounts of tailings,” but requires that HRI to capture and reinject radon gas back into the ground.230 The court defers to
NRC’s conclusion even though it is unsupported by any
quantitative indication of what “negligible” impact means
because, according to the court, NEPA does not mandate that
the agency offer hard data.231 Without this data, it is unclear
whether HRI’s “negligible” impacts will be inimical to public
health, and whether NRC deserves the court’s deference at all.
It was the same lack of data that originally prevented states
and the federal government from regulating uranium strip
mining, which contributed to the injury and the death of
hundreds of Navajo miners and their family members.
If, in addition to affirming NRC’s licensing decision, the
court were to have required adequate remediation, arguably, it
would have eliminated a major dispute between the parties,
226. Id.
227. Morris, 598 F.3d at 693 n.15.
228. The Council on Environmental Quality, the administrative body charged with
overseeing NEPA, defines “cumulative impacts” as, “[t]he impact on the environment
which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past,
present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions . . . Cumulative impacts can result
from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period
of time.” Cumulative impact, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2006).
229. Morris, 598 F.3d at 693.
230. Id. at 692–93.
231. Id. at 693.
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and may have better protected the Church Rock community.
The court missed an opportunity to demonstrate that
responsible, profitable resource extraction and public health
can coexist.
c.

The Court Approved HRI’s License Despite Its Inability to
Ensure Groundwater Restoration

Both HRI and NRC agree that ISL uranium mining will
inevitably contaminate the aquifer, both during and after
mining.232 The Petitioners disputed HRI’s baseline water
quality assessment. They argued that the nine “flushings”
HRI proposed to restore water quality was too few, and that as
a result, HRI’s surety to cover the cost of restoration was
woefully inadequate.233 Finding that NRC had taken a “hard
look” at the Petitioners’ environmental concerns, the court
denied Petitioners’ claims.234
To conduct its ISL mining operations, HRI plans to inject
“lixiviant”—a solution of groundwater mixed with oxygen and
bicarbonate—into wells drilled into the geological layer
containing uranium where the lixiviant absorbs the uranium
as it is pumped back to the surface.235 HRI will then separate
the uranium from the lixiviant and process the uranium for
use.236 After mining all available ore, HRI will flush
groundwater through the pores in the wellfield to return the
groundwater to acceptable water quality levels.237
AEA regulations require HRI to restore the groundwater
after the completion of an ISL operation, either to its preexisting condition or the maximum contamination level under
the SDWA.238 Those regulations required HRI to provide an

232. Id. at 694 (“Although . . . ‘in situ’ leach mining techniques are considered more
environmentally benign [than] traditional mining and milling practices they still tend
to contaminate groundwater.”) (quoting CONSIDERATION OF GEOCHEMICAL ISSUES IN
GROUNDWATER RESTORATION AT URANIUM IN-SITU LEACH MINING FACILITIES, U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NUREG-CR-6870 (Jan. 2007), available at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0706/ML070600405.pdf).
233. Morris, 598 F.3d at 693–94.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 682.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 695.
238. See Domestic Licensing of Source Material, 10 C.F.R. § 40, Appendix, Technical
Criterion 5 (2011).
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“adequate financial surety” based on the estimated cost of
restoration.239 The cost of restoration, however, depends upon
the level of water quality to which HRI pegs its restoration
efforts. The FEIS stated that pre-mining groundwater quality
in the Westwater Canyon aquifer is “good and meets New
Mexico drinking quality standards.”240 However, because HRI
averaged groundwater quality data from water within the
Church Rock mining site and outside the site from a different
section, contrary to NRC’s directive, it calculated a lower level
water quality.241 On this limited, potentially inaccurate water
quality data, NRC and the court accepted HRI’s assumption
that Section 17’s water quality was poor and HRI’s proposal to
flush the wellfield nine times.242 Until the actual water quality
of Section 17 has been determined, neither HRI nor NRC
knows the proper restoration standards or surety amount. By
allowing HRI proceed before these requirements are met, the
opportunity for public comment will have passed.
In addition, contrary to the AEA’s requirement that NRC
protect public health, NRC and the court tolerated high
amounts of uncertainty as to whether HRI’s license would
protect drinking water supplies during mining and ensure its
restoration afterwards. For example, although the FEIS and
the court acknowledged that the lixiviant used in ISL mining
may migrate to groundwater beyond the wellfield area, the
court
approved
HRI’s
license
without
mitigation
requirements.243 In addition, the FEIS conceded that
“successful restoration of a production-scale ISL wellfield has
not previously occurred” and that “site-specific tests conducted
by HRI have not demonstrated that the proposed restoration
standards can be achieved at a production scale.”244 NRC’s
hydrologist noted that HRI was not able to restore arsenic,
uranium and radium levels after substantial restoration
testing, but “it ‘was very close to’ and ‘was for all practical
purposes at the primary water standard’ for arsenic and
‘uranium was nearly in compliance with NRC standard, and
239. 10 C.F.R. § 40, Financial Criterion 9 (2006); Morris, 598 F.3d at 694.
240. Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 10 Morris v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 16.
241. Id. at 52.
242. Morris, 598 F.3d at 700–01.
243. Id. at 704.
244. Id.
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radium concentrations were restored to anticipated baseline
conditions.”245 Based on these findings, the FEIS concluded
that HRI could “eventually” achieve restoration.246
HRI’s past performance does not support this optimistic
conclusion. Between 1997 and 2000, URI reported ten spills at
its ISL sites in Texas, contaminating a total of 90,000 gallons
of water.247 Because NRC acknowledged these concerns in the
FEIS, however, the court held that NRC had complied with
NEPA.248 Whether or not NRC sufficiently fulfilled its duty
under NEPA, until HRI demonstrates its ability to fully
restore the groundwater to its pre-mining quality, HRI’s
license may be “inimical to” public health and safety under the
AEA.
Given the devastation from previous uranium mining in
Church Rock and current, elevated rates of radiation, even the
most “negligible,” cumulative impacts to air and water quality
should not be tolerated.249 When the Tenth Circuit approved
NRC’s licensing decision, expansive uranium mining projects it
was not writing on a blank slate; nor was the failure to
acknowledge the Navajo Nation’s history with uranium mining
in Morris out of ignorance of that history. Arguably, the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Morris will allow that history to repeat
itself.
In conclusion, in HRI III, the court validated New Mexico’s
regulatory authority over HRI’s mining operation under the
SDWA; and in Morris, the court dismissed substantial
protections to the Church Rock community’s public health and
environment provided by the AEA and NEPA. As discussed in
Part III below, these decisions jeopardize the immediate and
long-term health of the Church Rock community250—a
community already saddled with the degradation of
environmental and public health from previous experiments in
uranium mining.

245. Id. at 701.
246. Id. at 704.
247. Cooley, supra note 151, at 399.
248. Morris, 598 F.3d at 703–05.
249. See Petitioners’ Revised Opening Brief at 22 Morris v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 56–59.
250. See Morris, 598 F.3d at 705–6 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
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III. CHALLENGES FOR CHURCH ROCK AND SIMILARLY
SITUATED TRIBES AND TRIBAL COMMUNITIES
The spirit of our Federal trust responsibility and the
clear intent of Congress demand full and equal
protection of the environment of the entire nation
without exceptions or gaps under the programs for
which the EPA is responsible.251
HRI III and Morris alter the legal and environmental
landscape for Indian tribes across the United States. First, the
decisions depart from traditional common law upholding the
federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes and undermine
modern Indian self-determination policy. Second, the decisions
undermine the objective of federal environmental laws to
provide comprehensive protection and to respond to the needs
of local communities. Third, the decisions create a
fundamental inequity between the companies extracting
valuable minerals, the tribal communities bearing the brunt of
the resulting pollution and the state agencies that do not bear
a trust responsibility to the tribal community. In sum, the
Morris and HRI III decisions set tribes, resource extraction
companies, states and federal agencies on a collision course.
A.

HRI III and Morris Fail to Uphold the Federal Trust
Responsibility to Tribes

The Tenth Circuit’s failure to uphold the federal trust
responsibility may have far-reaching consequences for tribal
communities and their environments if other courts follow the
Tenth Circuit’s lead. Although courts are not entirely settled
as to when federal agencies should apply the principles of the
federal trust responsibility, courts have, albeit unevenly,
upheld tribes’ claims against the Secretary of Interior and
private companies for polluting activities occurring off the
reservation that harm the tribes’ natural resources.252
251. Memorandum from Barbara Blum, Deputy Adm’r on EPA Policy for Program
Implementation on Indian Lands, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional
Administrators, Assistant Administrators, Office Directors and General Counsel 3
(Dec. 19, 1980) [hereinafter EPA’s 1980 Indian Policy] (on file with author) (quoted in
James M. Grijalva, The Origins of EPA’s Indian Program, 15 WTR KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 191, 227 (2006)).
252. See, e.g., Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 469 F.3d 768, 788 (9th Cir.
2006) (reversing summary judgment for federal agencies which failed to take a “hard
look” at the impact of a geothermal project on the Pit River Tribe’s sacred, ancestral
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The federal trust responsibility arose from Indian tribes’
land cessions and their allegiance to the United States in
return for the United States’ recognition of tribal sovereignty
and its long-term fulfillment of treaty obligations.253 The
federal trust responsibility was also viewed as a safeguard
against state aggression towards Indian tribes.254 The original
perception that the federal trust responsibility only extended
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Congress and the courts
eventually gave way to the conclusion that the entire federal
government bears a trust responsibility to Indian tribes.255 The
Supreme Court has described this responsibility as one of
“moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust.”256
In the environmental context, courts have held that the
federal trust responsibility includes a “duty to protect against
damage or destruction”257 of natural resources such as
forests258 and wildlife, and to correct mismanagement of oil
and gas leases.259 In recent years, the Court has interpreted
sites off the reservation. The court ordered the agencies to undo the company’s lease
extensions and set aside its right to develop the land.); Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating privately-held, off-reservation
coal leases); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (upholding offreservation hunting and fishing rights on off-reservation private lands).
253. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515, 555–56 (1832).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (upholding the
authority of the federal government to prosecute certain crimes in Indian country in
part due to states’ ill will towards tribes: “[b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the
states where [the Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”).
255. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224,
1245 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[t]he federal trust responsibility imposes strict
fiduciary standards on the conduct of executive agencies—unless, of course, Congress
has expressly authorized a deviation from these standards”) (quoting Felix S. Cohen,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 225(1982) (citations omitted)). See United States
v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Mary Christina Wood,
Fulfilling the Executive’s Trust Responsibility Toward The Native Nations On
Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique Of The Clinton Administration’s Promises
And Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 749–62 (1995) (describing several agencies’
approaches towards tribes and the formal national Indian policies of the EPA and the
Dep’t of the Interior).
256. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942) (“Under a
humane and self-imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress
and numerous decisions of this Court, [the United States] has charged itself with
moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust.”).
257. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 672 (1987).
258. Id.
259. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986)
(per curium) (en banc) adopting Judge Seymour’s dissenting opinion, Jicarilla Apache
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the federal trust responsibility in the environmental context260
more narrowly, making the judicial resolution of federal
mismanagement of natural resources unpredictable.261
Courts and agencies alike are unsettled as to when a federal
agency should apply the principles of the trust doctrine. Some
scholars argue that agencies’ trust responsibility should be
applied when writing regulations affecting Indian country or
when administering statutes “for the benefit of Indians.”262
Others scholars argue that when statutes give an agency
discretion in its decision making, the agency should employ its
trust responsibility in making those decisions.263 Several
courts have significantly narrowed the trust responsibility to
statutory provisions imposing a specific duty upon a federal
agency.264 For example, in Navajo Nation v. United States,265
the Tribe sued the United States for approving coal leases at a
rate that was half of their market value. Although the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1938 imposed a duty on the Secretary of
Interior to approve higher lease rates for the Tribe, the Court
Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1556 (10th Cir. 1984) (affirming the trial
court’s decision that the federal government had breached its duties under the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 when it mismanaged Tribe’s oil and gas leases).
260. For a comprehensive review of the “Indian trust doctrine” and related cases see
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY § 1.9 (2005).
261. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (holding the Bureau of
Indian Affairs liable for damages to the Quinault Tribe for mismanagement and
damage to its old-growth forests), with North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (Secretary of the Interior did not breached its fiduciary duty to Native
Alaskans because the Secretary had complied with NEPA and the Endangered Species
Act, despite the Secretary’s sale of federal property with oil and gas potential
threatening the Inupiat communities’ subsistence reliance on the Bowhead whale and
other species) and United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 507 (2003) (5–3
decision) (Souter, J., dissenting) (no breach of trust where the Indian Mineral Leasing
Act of 1938 imposed no fiduciary duty on the federal government to negotiate coal
lease rates higher than statutory minimums).
262. See Skibine, supra note 137, at 4; Scott Hall, The Indian Law Canon of
Construction v. the Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous
Answer to the Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN. L. REV. 495 (2004).
263. Skibine, supra note 137, at 4.
264. See Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that there may be a “distinctive obligation of trust . . . [t]hat alone, however, does not
impose a duty on the government to take action beyond complying with generally
applicable statutes and regulations.”); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. F.A.A., 161
F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998); Miccosukee Tribe of Florida v. United States, 980 F. Supp.
448 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 121
F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1997); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
265. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 507 (2003).
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declined to find a breach of the federal trust responsibility.266
In HRI I, however, the court unanimously upheld the federal
trust responsibility, stating, “[t]he federal government bears a
special trust obligation to protect the interests of Indian tribes,
including protecting tribal property and jurisdiction.”267 The
court adhered to traditional Indian law jurisprudence when it
interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) and SDWA regulations
according to the Indian canons of construction,268 and adhered
to Supreme Court precedent instructing courts to resolve
ambiguity in favor of the Indians when determining
jurisdiction in dependent Indian communities.269 The HRI I
court stated: “[W]e . . . reaffirm that the [EPA] is to consider its
strict fiduciary obligation when interpreting regulations that
directly affect its ‘administ[ration of] Indian lands.’”270
Notably, the HRI III and Morris courts do not overrule HRI I
on the issue of the federal government’s trust responsibility—
they simply ignore it all together.271
266. The court found that the Act was intended to entrust Indian tribes with
primary authority to negotiate coal leases on Indian lands, in spite of the Secretary’s
approval and veto power over coal leases on Indian lands. Id. at 516 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “the ‘basic purpose’ of the Secretary’s powers under IMLA is
thus to “maximize tribal revenues from reservation lands” (quoting Kerr-McGee Corp.
v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 200 (1985)).
267. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224,
1245–48 (10th Cir. 2000) (rev’d on other grounds, Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States
Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010)) (en banc 6-5 decision)
(Lucero, J., dissenting on this point) (“Jurisdictional status of land implicates not only
ownership, but also the core sovereignty interests of Indian tribes and the federal
government in exercising civil and criminal authority over tribal territory . . . [The
trust duty] is most relevant, however, when an agency decision necessarily
incorporates a determination as to whether certain lands are within the scope of tribal
territorial sovereignty.”).
268. Id. at 1245. Two of the Indian canons of construction require that treaties,
agreements, statutes and executive orders be liberally construed in favor of the
Indians, (Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–432 (1943); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 551–557 (1832)) and that all ambiguities in them must be
resolved in favor of the Indians (McClanahan. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n 411 U.S. 164,
174 (1973); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908)); See Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 193–200 (1999).
269. HRI I, 198 F.3d 1224, 1244 note 13, 1245–48 (applying the Indian canons of
construction to its dependent Indian community analysis).
270. HRI I, 198 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Osage Tribal Council v. Dep’t of Labor, 187
F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296
(1942)).
271. For further discussion of courts’ movement away from fundamental tenants of
Indian law, see Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial
Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (2001); David Getches,
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Because the federal government has regulatory authority on
Section 17 land, the Tenth Circuit should have applied the
canons of construction to its interpretation of the AEA and
required federal agencies involved to act in accordance with
their federal trust responsibility. In Morris, the court did not
invoke the federal trust responsibility in its interpretation of
AEA regulation 10 C.F.R. § 20.1301.272 Instead, the Morris
court approved HRI’s license which included only the
minimum number of “flushings” to restore the groundwater,
despite HRI’s concession that it could not guarantee successful
groundwater remediation.273 Such experimentation with new
technology is inconsistent with a fiduciary’s responsibility to
act with the diligence of a prudent trustee to manage trust
assets of a beneficiary.274
The location of HRI’s mining does not wholly excuse the
federal government from exercising its trust responsibility
against private, non-Indian activity even if Section 8 is no
longer considered Indian country. Tribes have successfully
asserted claims for hunting and fishing rights on offreservation private land.275 Indian tribes have also succeeded
in NEPA-based suits against federal agencies to restrict nonIndian development threatening natural resources and sacred
sites off the reservation.276 In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: the New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in
Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1620–23 (1996).
272. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Navajo Nation in Support of Appellants’ Petition
for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 6–8 Morris v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677 (2010) (No. 07-9505) 2007 WL 4732316 at 6–8.
273. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677,
700–701 (10th Cir. 2010).
274. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying general
trust principles trust responsibility of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in its role as the
administrator of trust accounts); Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp.2d 1, (D.D.C. 1999)
(mismanagement of individual Indian trust funds amounted to a breach of the
government’s trust responsibility); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians Inc. v. United
States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (“[t]he Government as trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiary” quoted in Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 170(1) (1959)); United States
v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973) (The federal government as trustee must manage
the assets of an tribal beneficiary according to the same standards as a private
trustee). Cf. Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 988 (Ct. Cl. 1980)
(not all principles of trust law should apply unless they warrant application).
275. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
276. Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 469 F.3d 768, 788 (9th Cir. 2006)
(reversing summary judgment for federal agencies which failed to take a “hard look” at
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Hodel, the court invalidated privately-held, off-reservation coal
leases and ordered the district court to stay the mining
operation if it found irreparable harm to the Tribe’s
environmental, cultural, social and economic interests.277
More recently, in Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States,
however, the Ninth Circuit failed to find a breach of the federal
trust responsibility when tribal waters were contaminated by
cyanide heap-leach gold mining permitted by the Bureau of
Land Management because the mining occurred on offreservation private lands.278 In contrast to Gros Ventre Tribe,
in HRI III and Morris, the federal government, Tribe and
individual Navajo retained rights and interests in the land to
be used for uranium mining. The federal government retained
regulatory authority over both Section 8 (part of the dependent
Indian community of Church Rock) and Section 17 land (where
the federal government administers the AEA).279 Therefore,
unlike in Gros Ventre, the Tribe has an unmistakable property
interest in the land and the federal government manages those
properties, giving rise to a clear trust responsibility. Although
Gros Ventre Tribe may limit tribes’ success in suits challenging
polluting activities off the reservation where the tribe is
without a property right, the federal trust responsibility theory
remains viable in future cases.
B.

HRI III Undermines Comprehensive Environmental
Regulation

The checkerboarding that HRI III produces will undermine
comprehensive environmental protection in checkerboard
areas for three reasons. First, on a practical level, the HRI III
decision creates a multi-sovereign regulatory regime among
tribal, state and federal governments. Under this regime,
companies will encounter a dizzying array of potentially
the impact of a geothermal project on the Pit River Tribe’s sacred, ancestral sites off
the reservation. The court ordered the agencies to undo the company’s lease extensions
and set aside its right to develop the land.).
277. See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1988).
278. Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 812–13 (9th Cir. 2006).
279. See Robert T. Anderson et al., supra note 3, at 431–32 (discussing the extent of
federal “control and supervision” under a statute required to create enforceable duties
upon which a tribe may succeed on a breach of trust claim against the federal
government, including tribal trust assets subject to a “comprehensive and pervasive”
regulatory scheme and federal control over trust assets to the exclusion of the tribe).
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conflicting regulations and administrative decisions. Second,
uncertainty and confusion regarding Indian country
jurisdiction may increase the cost of regulatory enforcement
beyond the means and willpower of any agency, resulting in
less enforcement. Jurisdictional uncertainty will heighten the
stakes of each administrative decision and may exacerbate
existing tension between states and tribes.280 Finally, the sheer
administrative cost and duplication of tribal, state and federal
agencies’ research, monitoring and enforcement counsels
against a multi-sovereign regulatory scheme in environmental
law. HRI III will create an environmental “no-man’s land,” in
which resident tribal communities will be left unprotected.
One need not speculate. Scholars and tribal leaders already
criticize
multi-sovereign
jurisdictional
schemes
in
checkerboard areas in the context of criminal and zoning law.
For example, history shows that when states possess criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country under Public Law 280, their lack
of attention to tribal needs and the jurisdictional complexity in
checkerboard areas produce “legal vacuums.”281 The resulting
public safety crisis has forced some states to concede that
checkerboard jurisdiction is unworkable and that it is
necessary to work with tribes to mitigate its effects.282 In a
case involving a dispute over the Yakima Nation’s zoning
authority, Justice Blackman asked:
[H]ow can anyone doubt that a tribe’s inability to zone
substantial tracts of fee land within its own
reservation—tracts that are inextricably intermingled
with reservation trust lands—would destroy the tribe’s
ability to engage in the systematic and coordinated
280. For example, the opposition of the Yankton Sioux Tribe to South Dakota’s
development of an unlined landfill in a checkerboard area culminated in the Supreme
Court’s decision that the area was no longer Indian country. South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998). For a critique, see Royster, supra note 10.
281. For a discussion of “legal vacuums” created in Indian country when criminal
jurisdiction passed to several states under Public Law 280 see Carol GoldbergAmbrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian
Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1418–26 (1997). In relevant part, Goldberg-Ambrose
discusses the dispute over the dumping of human waste sludge on the Torres-Martinez
Reservation, which erupted into violence because neither the tribe, state nor federal
government had clear authority to stop the dumping.
282. Carol Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the TwentyFirst Century? Some Data At Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 726–29 (2006) (discussing
tribal-state concurrent jurisdiction and cross-deputization agreements to ensure law
enforcement in Indian country in Public Law 280 states).
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utilization of land that is the very essence of zoning
authority?283 . . . The threat to the tribe does not derive
solely from the proposed uses of specific parcels of fee
lands . . . [T]he threat stems from the loss of the general
and longer term advantages of comprehensive land
management.284
Courts, states and federal agencies alike should heed the
lessons learned from the criminal and zoning contexts and
spare tribal communities the burden of coping with judgemade jurisdictional entanglement.
Second, at the policy level, the public and federal
government should be concerned by the ease with which HRI
III and Morris undermine Congress’s intent for federal
environmental laws. For example, the purpose of the SDWA
was to “assure that all citizens . . . would be provided high
quality water supplies.”285 The SDWA and its amendments
place special emphasis on protecting groundwater and sought
to streamline enforcement under the Act.286 Specifically, EPA
chose to treat tribal lands as single administrative units to
ensure comprehensive environmental protection under the
SDWA.287 In its brief to the en banc court in HRI III, the EPA
explicitly stated that “[a]voiding checkerboarding is especially
important for purposes of the SDWA [Underground Injection
Control] program because groundwater aquifers are not
delineated by land ownership boundaries.”288 As Judge
Lucero’s dissent highlighted, checkerboard jurisdiction makes
little sense if the purpose of the SDWA is to protect
surrounding groundwater.289 After HRI III and Morris, if no

283. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 458 (1989) (plurality opinion determining the Yakima Nation’s authority to
zone land use on its reservation).
284. Id. at 460.
285. S. REP. No. 99-56, at 1–3 (1985).
286. Id.
287. Memorandum from EPA Administrator William K. Reilly on EPA, Federal,
Tribal and State Roles in the Protection and Regulation of Reservation Environments
to Assistant Administrators, General Counsel, Inspector General, Regional
Administrators, Associate Administrators, and Staff Office Directors (July 10, 1991).
288. EPA’s Supplemental Brief for the En Banc Court at 13 Hydro Res., Inc. v.
United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131 (2010) (No. 07-9506), 2009
WL 3375299.
289. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131,
1174 (10th Cir. 2010) (Ebel, J., dissenting).
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single sovereign is responsible for coordinating the regulatory
enforcement efforts among tribal, state and federal
governments, SDWA enforcement efforts will lack consistency
and will not be streamlined.
Third, HRI III and Morris fail to recognize the EPA’s longstanding concern that if the state has regulatory authority
over tribes, they may neglect tribal interests. In 1982, the
EPA’s Director of Federal Activities warned that “reservation
needs and priorities . . . may not be adequately reflected in the
state’s environmental policies, funding and program
implementation” if states assumed regulatory jurisdiction over
tribal lands.290 The EPA’s concern stems from the original
impetus of federal trust responsibility—to defend tribes from
harmful state policies291—and reflects the consensus that
states had been negligent in their duty to protect the
environment.292 In recognition of these concerns, Congress
authorized tribes to assume primary implementation authority
under the “treatment as state” provisions in several federal
environmental laws.293 Although tribal environmental
protection can implicate non-Indian activities in neighboring
counties and cities, courts have affirmed tribes’ regulatory
action and authority under treatment as state provisions.294

290. Grijalva, supra note 251, at 261 n.412. See also EPA’s 1980 Indian Policy, supra
note 251 (noting that “[t]he environmental is generally best protected by those who
have the concern and the ability to protect it.”).
291. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (upholding the
authority of the federal government to prosecute certain crimes in Indian country in
part due ill will of the states: “[b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the states
where [the Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”).
292. Grijalva, supra note 251, at 199.
293. Id. at 228. Programs with “treatment as state” provisions include: Clean Air
Act, 40 C.F.R. § 9, 35, 49, 50, and 81; Clean Water Act, 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.8, 123.31,
233.60, 501.22; Safe Drinking Water Act, 40 C.F.R. §§ 142.72, 145.52; the Toxic
Substance Control Act, 40 C.F.R. § 745.324 (2008); and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act, 40 C.F.R. § 171.10 (2008).
294. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 748 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[O]nce a tribe is
given TAS [treatment as state] status, it has the power to require upstream offreservation dischargers, conducting activities that may be economically valuable to the
state . . . to make sure that their activities do not result in contamination of the
downstream on-reservation waters.”); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415,
423-24 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding EPA’s authority to require upstream water user
(Albuquerque) to comply with downstream tribe’s water quality standards under the
Clean Water Act). For discussion of other statutes implicating non-Indian, offreservation interests, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond
The Reservation Borders, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003 (2008).
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The Navajo Nation currently administers two of the three
parts of the SDWA, including the UIC program, both on and
off the reservation.295 Had tribal jurisdiction extended to HRI’s
parcel, HRI would have had to obtain a permit from the Tribe.
Thus, when the court determined that Section 8 is not Indian
country, it eliminated any prospect of the Navajo Nation
providing regulatory protection for its own community and
ignored local demand for a livable environment. A multisovereign regulatory regime in the Church Rock Chapter is
unworkable. Overall, the HRI III decision undermines the
EPA’s policy of comprehensive environmental protection
“without exceptions or gaps.”296
C.

HRI III and Morris Increase the Vulnerability of Tribal
Communities Living Adjacent to Reservations

The HRI III and Morris decisions inequitably distribute the
risks and costs of environmental damage between tribes,
states, the federal government and private companies. Going
forward, companies in checkerboard areas adjacent to
reservations will extract valuable resources, tribal
communities will bear the costs of degraded environments and
public health, and states may avoid direct accountability to the
tribal community.
1.

Clarifying Church Rock’s Unique Predicament

Understanding the unique predicament of tribal
communities living adjacent to reservations reveals the
broader implications of HRI III and Morris. It also suggests
possible solutions to correct the inequitable distribution of
environmental damage, costs and liabilities. Three
characteristics of Church Rock help illustrate the community’s
295. 40 C.F.R. § 147.3400 Navajo Indian Lands--Class II wells (2008) (delegating
primary authority to Navajo Nation for the UIC program for Class II wells both on and
off the reservation, but not including the Sections of the Church Rock Chapter at issue
in HRI III or Morris) incorporating Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program;
Primacy Approval, 73 Fed. Reg. 65556 (Nov. 4, 2008). Although several environmental
laws restrict tribal regulatory jurisdiction to the exterior boundaries of the
reservation, the SDWA extends tribal jurisdiction to “the area of the Tribal
Government’s jurisdiction,” which, under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) and (c) may extend to
dependent Indian communities and trust allotments off the reservation. See Indian
Tribes, 40 C.F.R. §§ 142.52, 56, 58 (2011).
296. EPA’s 1980 Indian Policy, supra note 251.
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predicament.
First, if Church Rock was located on the reservation, the
tribe could potentially regulate uranium mining under the
SDWA’s “treatment as state” provision.297 Yet, as a tribal
community located adjacent to the reservation, whose
members are enrolled in the tribe, receive tribal services and
participate in tribal affairs, Church Rock cannot benefit from
the protections their relatives and neighbors enjoy on the other
side of the reservation boundary. Second, after HRI III, the
Church Rock community must take its grievances for damage
stemming from HRI’s activities on Section 8 lands to the
SDWA licensing authority—the State of New Mexico.
However, the State of New Mexico bears no trust responsibility
to the tribal community and, as noted, states typically offer
less protection of tribal interests.298
Third, if a non-Indian community’s health and environment
were severely impacted by resource extraction, members of
such a community may decide to relocate in response to the
public health threat. However, due to kinship, ancestral and
spiritual ties to the land, opportunities for education in the
native language and local grazing leases, “relocation is not an
option for Indian people.”299 Church Rock residents should not
have to relocate. Judicial doctrine and treaties recognize that
tribal lands were set aside for the purpose of creating a
permanent homeland for American Indians.300 Thus, “voting
with one’s feet”—a crucial aspect of democratic federalism—
will not protect Church Rock residents. Because tribal lands
are the only homeland for future generations of American
297. See statutes cited supra notes 293 and 295.
298. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (upholding the
authority of the federal government to prosecute certain crimes in Indian country in
part due ill will of the states: “[b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the states
where [the Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”).
299. See Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 458 (1989) (noting that “[t]his
fundamental sovereign power of local governments to control land use is especially
vital to Indians, who enjoy a unique historical and cultural connection to the land.”
(citation omitted)); EPA 1980 Indian Policy, supra note 251 (recognizing that “only if
we preserve our natural environment, only then, will future generations of Indian
people have the opportunity to choose to follow traditional ways . . .”). See generally
Rebecca Tsosie, supra note 7.
300. Courts have recognized tribes’ water rights as a necessary corollary to the
establishment of Indian reservations as permanent homelands for tribes for over a
century. See cases cited supra note 5.
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Indians, environmental protection to sustain tribal vitality is
essential.
The Tenth Circuit’s decisions place an inordinate burden
upon the Church Rock community which had no voice in
jurisdictional policy and which is ill-equipped to absorb the
health, environmental and economic costs from further
degradation. When tribes cannot protect their communities
living adjacent to a reservation, tribal communities are left
without a directly accountable sovereign—tribal, state or
federal. This fundamental inequity offends democratic notions
of accountability and is plainly unjust. If future courts follow
HRI III and Morris, the Church Rock community will not be
the only tribal community facing increasing threats to health
and environment.
2.

Implications of the Tenth Circuit’s Inequitable
Distribution of Authority, Risk and Cost

History reveals that companies may find less restrictive
regulatory environments on lands adjacent to Indian
reservations. Extractive industries began development on
tribal lands in the late 1960s, when the DOI and DOE began
encouraging their development.301 At that time, federal
enforcement of environmental laws on tribal lands was scant,
creating a favorable business climate.302 In fact, it was the
resulting industrial pollution on reservations and lands
adjacent to them that motivated the EPA to move towards
tribal implementation of environmental programs.303
As environmental regulation has improved on reservations
themselves, the regulatory gaps have moved from reservations
to adjacent lands. Similar to HRI III, Yankton Sioux Tribe v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency304 illustrates
how tribes can lose land and jurisdiction when companies
pursue environmentally-risky projects on private land in
checkerboard areas. In Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Tribe sued to
301. Grijalva, supra note 251, at 213–15.
302. Id. at 213.
303. EPA 1980 Indian Policy, supra note 251 (noting that “some reservations face
the prospect of large-scale energy development, either on-reservation or nearby, with
potentially massive environmental consequences for reservation lands.”).
304. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Management Dist., 890 F.
Supp. 878, 888–92 (D.S.D. 1995), overruled by South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,
522 U.S. 329 (1998). For an explanation of this case, see Royster, supra note 10.
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enjoin the construction of a solid waste landfill on private land
within the exterior boundaries of its reservation, and to contest
the EPA’s waiver of the federal requirement to line the landfill
to protect groundwater quality.305 The district court recognized
the EPA’s regulatory authority over the landfill because it was
located on non-Indian land in Indian country.306 When the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, the State appealed, and
the Supreme Court held that in fact, the landfill site was no
longer Indian country at all. 307 Regulatory authority passed to
the State of South Dakota, and the clay liner requirement was
not enforced. Thus, Yankton Sioux Tribe illustrates how a
tribe’s attempt to protect its communities from environmental
degradation can provoke contentious jurisdictional issues
resulting in a tribe’s loss of land, jurisdiction and
environmental protection.
It is in the interest of tribal, state and federal leaders to
address the predicament of tribal communities adjacent to
reservations because natural resource conflicts in these areas
are likely to continue. As illustrated in Yankton Sioux Tribe,
resource extraction companies may find checkerboard areas off
the reservation appealing if regulations in those areas are
perceived to be relaxed or ineffective.308 In addition, tribes may
increasingly seek to provide environmental protection to all of
their communities, both on and adjacent to the reservation.
Since the 1980s, thirty-six tribes have developed water quality
standards under the Clean Water Act,309 and thirty-two tribes
are now eligible to administer programs under the Clean Air
Act.310 The financial and administrative investment Congress
requires of tribes to apply for, develop and implement
environmental programs is a testament to tribes’ commitment
305. Royster, supra note 10, at 297–99.
306. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 890 F. Supp. at 893.
307. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 329.
308. See, e.g., Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 950 F.
Supp. 1471, 1482 (D.S.D. 1996).
309. TRIBAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS APPROVED BY EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/waterquality/standards/wqslibrary/
tribes.cfm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
310. Tribal
Air,
Basic
Information,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oar/tribal/backgrnd.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) (In addition, 99
tribes are receiving air grant support, 78 tribes are monitoring hazardous air
pollutants, 22 tribes are implementing programs to reduce toxic air pollutants, 56
tribes have completed inventories of emission sources on their reservation.).
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to protect the environment for future generations.
Because tribal environmental regulation makes it more
tedious and risky for energy companies to pursue resource
development on a reservation, companies will gravitate
towards land adjacent to the reservation that offers the same
resources under state jurisdiction. In such situations, tribes
must face the difficult decision whether to pursue
environmental protection to protect their communities in these
areas, while risking their territorial sovereignty and
jurisdiction in the process. This trade-off is unnecessary and
unjust.
IV. REMAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
HEALTH IN CHECKERBOARD AREAS
In recognition of its trust responsibility and the objectives of
the AEA, NEPA and SDWA, the federal government has the
opportunity to take two steps that could significantly decrease
natural resource conflicts in checkerboard areas. First, the
federal government can retain environmental regulatory
authority over checkerboard areas in order to fulfill its trust
responsibility to protect a tribe’s natural resources located on
or off the reservation. Second, the federal government can
mandate that federal agencies write “Indian Trust Impact
Statements” to clarify when a tribe’s natural resources will be
affected and how those resources will be protected.
A.

Retention of Federal Environmental Regulatory Authority
Over Checkerboard Areas

When a tribal community adjacent to a reservation will bear
the brunt of environmental and public health damage from a
resource extraction project located on private land, and tribal
environmental regulation is unable to protect that community,
this comment argues that the federal government should
retain regulatory authority over that land. The legal basis for
retaining federal authority over private land in checkerboard
areas adjacent to a reservation is twofold. First, the federal
government’s trust responsibility to tribes includes the
protection of certain natural resources.311 Second, the federal
311. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 672 (1987)
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government’s retention of regulatory authority can uphold the
purpose of environmental laws to provide comprehensive
environmental protection and accountability at the local
level.312 The goal of this recommendation is not to prevent
resource extraction, or unnecessarily impede state jurisdiction,
but rather, to maximize the protection of the environment and
public health by avoiding the multi-sovereign regulatory
regimes produced by HRI III.
Under trust law, a fiduciary is required to manage the trust
with the skill and prudence of a reasonable person in the
conduct of his own business.313 The duties that apply to a
private fiduciary generally apply to the federal government as
well.314 Because the Navajo Nation’s water rights extend to
groundwater,315 and because the federal government must
protect that groundwater under the AEA and SDWA (UIC
program), the federal government’s trust responsibility
includes the protection of the Westwater Canyon Aquifer. In
(Where regulations required the federal government to responsibly manage and obtain
revenue from Tribe’s forests in a manner “consistent with eth proper protection and
improvement of forests,” the government’s excessive timber harvesting constituted a
breach of the trustee’s [government’s] fiduciary duty.); United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206 (1983) (holding the Bureau of Indian Affairs liable for damages to the
Quinault Tribe for mismanagement and damage to its old-growth forests); Rodgers,
supra note 260.
312. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006) (requiring states to develop comprehensive
programs or preventing and eliminating pollution in surface and groundwaters); 42
U.S.C. § 7410 (2006) (requiring states to develop implementation plans for national
ambient air quality standards to enforce in each air quality control region).
313. George Bogert, TRUSTS (6th ed.) § 93 (1987).
314. Id. See also cases cited supra note 274.
315. 22 Navajo Nation Code § 1103(A) (2011) (Navajo Nation asserts title to “all
surface and groundwaters which are contained within hydrologic systems located
exclusively within the lands of the Navajo Nation; and . . . all groundwaters located
beneath the surface of the lands held in trust by the United States of America for the
Navajo Nation.”); See Title X Water Rights, Subtitle A--San Joaquin River Restoration
Settlement of the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, PL 111–11, 123 Stat
991. In addition, the majority of federal and state courts recognize that tribally
reserved water rights include groundwater based upon the Winters doctrine. See
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See, e.g., United States v. Washington
Dep’t of Ecology, 375 F. Supp.2d 1050, 1058 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (recognizing the rights
of the Lummi Tribe to groundwater beneath the Reservation and the Lummi
Peninsula); In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
System and Source, 989 P.2d 739, 745, 747–48 (Ariz. 1999) (recognizing tribal reserved
water rights to groundwater); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Stults, 59
P.3d 1093, 1099 (Mont. 2002) (same); But see Big Horn I, 753 P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo. 1988)
(tribal reserved water rights do not extend to groundwater), aff’d by an equally divided
Court, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
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Morris, HRI already conceded that its ISL mining will
contaminate the aquifer and that complete restoration of the
groundwater to drinking-water quality is not guaranteed.316
In the aftermath of HRI III, HRI is moving forward with
operations that threaten Indian trust assets,317 triggering the
EPA’s trust responsibility to protect the underlying aquifer.
Federal delegation of SDWA permitting authority to a state
over projects that directly and severely impact tribal members’
health and tribal trust resources, either on or off the
reservation, is inconsistent with the EPA’s trust responsibility.
Fortunately, three alternative options are available to the
EPA. First, the HRI III majority specifically left open to the
EPA the possibility of revising its regulations in order to
reassume jurisdiction over Section 8.318 For example, if the
EPA were to define its regulatory authority on the basis of an
aquifer or an aquifer’s geo-spatial relationship to a
predominantly tribal community, the EPA would not
necessarily encounter the same issue of checkerboard
jurisdiction and the HRI III decision.
Second, the SDWA provides for “revision” of New Mexico’s
UIC program under 40 C.F.R. § 145.32. This Section permits
the EPA to unilaterally revise the State’s UIC program, such
that the EPA reassumes jurisdiction over certain lands (which
EPA did in order to assume authority over Section 8 prior to
the HRI I decision).319 The EPA regulations under 40 C.F.R.
316. Morris v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Morris), 598 F.3d 677,
694 (10th Cir. 2010). See J.A. DAVIS, G.P. CURTIS, supra note 14 (noting that
“[i]ndustry experience shows that elevated concentrations of arsenic, selenium,
radium, uranium, molybdenum, radium, uranium, and vanadium still existed after
extensive groundwater restoration activities.” (internal citations omitted)).
317. 317. LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS, URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT (2010).
318. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI III), 608 F.3d 1131,
1135 (10th Cir. 2010)) (en banc 6-5 decision) (“None of this is to say that EPA must
tether its SDWA permitting authority to a statute defining the scope of the federal
government’s criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands. Had EPA chosen to define its
authority under the SDWA in a different way, the result in this case might have been
different.”).
319. Hydro Res., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency (HRI I), 198 F.3d 1224,
1243–44 (10th Cir. 2000). (affirming EPA’s revision of New Mexico’s authority under
the SDWA, UIC program such that EPA reassumed jurisdiction over Section 8 because
Section 8’s Indian country status was “in dispute.”). The final rule establishing the
Underground Injection Program for Certain Indian Lands, 53 Fed. Reg. 43096–7
(1988), provides EPA with the discretion to reassume jurisdiction of non-Indian lands
even after the status of those lands is no longer Indian country, or no longer “in
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Section 145.33, Criteria for withdrawal of State programs,
however, effectively restrict the EPA’s ability to revise State
UIC programs to situations in which a state is failing to meet
the requirements of the program or to enforce penalties.
Third, the EPA can retain authority over Section 8 according
to its trust responsibility, to ensure adequate protection of
substantial trust resource—drinking water from the
Westwater Canyon Aquifer. Returning regulatory authority to
the EPA would not amount to a de-delegation of the entire UIC
program from the State of New Mexico.320 Nor would a
reversion offend the HRI III decision, since the land status of
private property like Section 8 would not change from “nonIndian country” to “Indian country.” Returning SDWA
regulatory authority to the EPA would not stem from the
jurisdictional status of HRI’s parcel of land, but rather from
the federal government’s trust responsibility to protect a tribal
trust resource underlying private land. This solution applies
the federal trust responsibility to licensing decisions and would
increase the likelihood of comprehensive environmental
protection and accountability to the community.
Courts have protected tribal environmental resources from
harm stemming from off-reservation industrial development in
the past.321 Due to the highly political nature of natural
resource conflicts, however, the federal government has lacked
a uniform approach to its protection efforts. Without a
coordinated approach, companies can develop resources
adjacent to the community and potentially damage trust
resources with impunity, threatening Indian communities’
ability to continue living there. Therefore, when companies
pursue risky development projects on private lands in tribal
communities adjacent to the reservation, and tribal
environmental regulatory authority is unable to protect those
dispute:” “the intent of the last sentence of section 1422(e) is to make sure that all
Indian lands are covered by some UIC program There will be cases in which a Tribe
does not apply for primacy or cannot demonstrate its jurisdiction, but a State could not
administer the UIC program on those lands. The EPA must administer the UIC
programs for those lands.”
320. HRI I, 198 F.3d 1224, 1241–44 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting HRI’s “tail wags the
dog” argument that a small jurisdictional reversion to the EPA amounted to a
determination that the state’s UIC program no longer satisfied the federal
requirements set forth in SDWA regulations. See State primary enforcement
responsibility, 40 C.F.R. § 300h-1(b)(3) (2011).
321. See cases cited supra note 252.
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lands, the federal
regulatory authority.
B.

government

must

assume

primary

Indian Trust Impact Statements

As discussed in Part III.A.1, the HRI III and Morris
decisions highlight the critical problem of courts’ lack of
enforcement of the federal trust responsibility.322 In particular,
the Morris decision demonstrates how this problem can stem
from a court’s choice between applying Chevron deference323 or
the “Indian canons of construction.”324 Thus, the Morris
decision forces us to look for better ways to reconcile federal
agencies’ dual roles as regulators and tribal fiduciaries.325
Before a court offers broad Chevron deference to an agency’s
statutory interpretation, it should take special care to
determine whether the agency is acting in its “regulating”
capacity with plenary authority or as fiduciary.326 Where an
agency’s role as regulator and fiduciary conflict, Judith Royster
posits that courts should not accept any “reasonable” statutory
interpretation an agency offers.327 Rather, courts can require
an agency to harmonize its roles as regulator and fiduciary.
Agencies can harmonize their dual role by drafting “Indian
Trust Impact Statements,” a description of the trust resource
that will be impacted by a particular project and the steps an
322. See discussion, supra Part III.A.
323. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 840 (1984) (agency’s interpretations of a statute it administers is entitled to
judicial deference if it is based on a reasonable construction of the statute).
324. See cases and accompanying text cited supra note 268.
325. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–82 (1886) (upholding the
authority of the federal government to prosecute certain crimes in Indian country in
part due ill will of the states: “[b]ecause of local ill feeling, the people of the states
where [the Indian tribes] are found are often their deadliest enemies”); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903) (holding that Congress has the power to abrogate
treaties with Indian tribes).
326. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.
1986) (per curium) (en banc) adopting Judge Seymour’s dissenting opinion, Jicarilla
Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1556, 1567 (10th Cir. 1984)
(finding that “[w]hen the Secretary is acting in his fiduciary role rather than solely as
a regulator and is faced with a decision for which there is more than one ‘reasonable’
choice as that term is used in administrative law, he must choose the alternative that
is in the best interests of the Indian tribe. In short, he cannot escape his role as trustee
by donning the mantle of administrator, a principle recently made explicit by this
court in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir.1982).”).
327. Royster, supra note 10, at 301.
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agency will take to mitigate that impact. At a minimum,
Indian Trust Impact Statements would increase agencies’
transparency and would potentially mitigate the federal
government’s abrogation of its trust responsibility to tribes.
The American Indian Policy Review Commission, an
investigative body established by Congress in 1975 to review
and report on federal Indian policy,328 recommended that
agencies prepare and submit an Indian Trust Impact
Statement to an appropriate congressional committee for
approval before taking action that may abrogate or infringe on
treaty rights or non-treaty rights protected by the trust
responsibility.329 A variation on the concept of an Indian Trust
Impact Statement would incorporate the Statement as the last
step in an agency’s tribal consultation process.330 Tribal
consultation was established as a means of improving
government-to-government relations between the federal
government and tribes. However, tribes have been
disappointed by this promising practice due to its lack of
substantive requirements and agencies’ failure to integrate
tribal preferences in their decisions.331 An Indian Trust Impact
Statement would concretize the tribal consultation process
with a judicially or congressionally reviewable product that
would demonstrate that an agency had carried out its trust
responsibility in making its decision.
Specifically, the Indian Trust Impact Statement would (1)
describe the project to be undertaken and its expected impact
on an identified tribal community; (2) describe the tribal
328. 1 Am. Indian Policy Review Comm’n, Final Report 3 (1977).
329. Id. at 137, cited in Rodgers supra note 260.
330. See Executive Order No. 13175 FR 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000) (requiring each federal
agency to develop an “accountable process” to ensure meaningful consultation with
tribes and their input into federal policy and regulation). For an example of an
agency’s tribal consultation process, see Fish and Wildlife Service, Secretarial Order
No. 3206: American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and
the Endangered Species Act, http://www.fws.gov/ (search “Secretarial Order No.
3206”).
331. See White House Meeting with Tribal Leaders: Background Paper on Tribal
Consultation and Tribal Sovereignty, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS
(Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.ncai.org (follow “About” tab to “News Archive,” choose
August 2009 and follow link to the Background Paper); see also Quechan Tribe of Fort
Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 755 F. Supp.2d 1104 (S.D.Cal.,
2010) (granting a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the tribe was likely to
prevail on claim that the Bureau of Land Management had failed to adequately
consult Tribe before approving solar energy project).
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consultation process and decisions made pursuant to
consultation; (3) set forth chosen statutory interpretations and
rejected alternatives; (4) describe the nature and extent of
tribal consent to the project; (5) identify any treaty or nontreaty rights infringed or abrogated; and (6) describe steps the
agency will take to mitigate impact to the trust resource(s).
Where an agency’s fiduciary duty cannot be reconciled with its
regulatory function, the agency would seek congressional
approval for a project abrogating or infringing upon a tribe’s
treaty or non-treaty rights. Congress could then approve or
deny the project, and appropriately compensate the tribe.332
The final benefit of an Indian Trust Impact Statement would
be to restrict the role of the courts in decisions regarding the
fiduciary duties of federal agencies and limit judicial
subjectivity in this area.333 In the end, Indian Trust Impact
Statements would provide an agency-based, pre-emptive
approach to reconciling the dual role of federal agencies as
regulator and fiduciary. In doing so, Indian Trust Impact
Statements may help slow the current erosion of the federal
trust responsibility and reinvigorate environmental protection
in vulnerable tribal communities.
V.

CONCLUSION

Jurisdictional disputes arising from natural resource
conflicts implicate the sovereign interests of tribes, states and
the federal government as well as a company’s bottom line.
After HRI has recovered uranium from its lands in Section 8
and Section 17, the land will have little value to HRI. In
contrast, the Navajo people will depend on the land, water
from the Westwater Canyon Aquifer, and other resources in
Church Rock for generations to come. This natural resource
conflict could be substantially defused outside the courtroom.
If the EPA retained jurisdiction over HRI’s Section 8 land
parcel and developed an Indian Trust Impact Statement, the
tribe could at least appeal to the federal government, a
directly-accountable sovereign, for ensuing damages.
In the meantime, HRI is planning to proceed with its mining

332. Final Report of the American Indian Policy Review Commission, Vol. 1, ch. 4
(1977).
333. See sources cited supra note 271.
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operations in Church Rock beginning in 2013.334 The
Petitioners in Morris have submitted a petition against the
United States in the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights alleging violations of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man and the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.335
The federal government’s trust responsibility extends to all
tribal communities. Thus the federal government should work
to clarify regulatory jurisdiction over air and groundwater
resources in checkerboard areas adjacent to reservations in
order to ensure livable environments for future generations.
The federal government should act swiftly to correct the
inequitable distribution of authority and risk produced by the
Tenth Circuit’s decisions. Without such action, the federal
government will contribute to the endangerment of many lives
and the promise of a “livable environment” to future
generations of Navajo people.

334. LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS, URANIUM RESOURCES INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT
(2010).
335. See Petition of the Eastern Navajo Diné Against Uranium Mining, et. al,
against the United States of America to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, available at http://nmenvirolaw.org/images/pdf/ENDAUM_Final_Petition_with
_figures.pdf; see also April Reese, Navajo Group to Take Uranium Mine Challenge to
Human Rights Commission, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2011/05/12/12greenwire-navajo-group-to-take-uranium-mine-challenge-to33718.html?pagewanted=all.
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